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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1626



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Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 1-2

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ARMED FORCES

ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS

Personnel Problems Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 81 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col Ye. Babynin: "But Where Are the High Principles?"]

[Text] When encountering officers, by habit he started to put his hand to his deer-skin cap in a salute. Catching himself, he explained that he had forgot that he was now a reserve warrant officer. It is hard to shake the habits learned during seven years in the army....

When we proceeded to discuss former company sergeant major Warrant Officer V. Litvinov, who had written a letter to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Capt A. Teplyuk sighed: "A capable, able man of initiative. Suffice it to say that in only one month's time he had things in the barracks in exemplary order." Many men in the military construction detachment express regret that Litvinov was discharged from the army. They stress his management skills and ability to communicate with people.

Many noted what in their opinion was their former comrade's most valuable trait: he was always able to come up with short-supply materials. It was precisely his ability to "hustle things up" which to a considerable degree did detriment to Litvinov's career in the military....

In command of a platoon, he spent less time on training and indoctrinating his men than on administrative affairs. It was always necessary to obtain something or other. Frequently he would obtain paints and building materials for improving personnel housing. Col M. Serkov, commander of the military construction detachment, was always sure that when he sent his subordinate on a "trip," the latter would bring back everything that was needed. He was never disappointed. Praise was heaped upon this warrant officer, and was named an example for other to emulate. And Litvinov began to sense his exceptional status. His behavior changed. He was starting to be rude to the military construction personnel under him and to be disrespectful toward his superiors.

Col M. Serkov admonished Litvinov time and again, but the latter paid no attention. The detachment commander's feelings toward him were changing. Now Litvinov frequently received disciplinary punishment, a total of eight just in the last year of service. We shall not debate the justice of the punishments, for they were

essentially fair, except perhaps the last one, which played a decisive role in the warrant officer's service career.

It happened on New Year's Eve. Acting company commander Lieutenant Reshetov gave military construction worker Private Puchok a three-day pass to go home. He explained to Warrant Officer Litvinov that everything had been done with the consent of the detachment commander and had been done "according to regulations." For three days at evening roll call Litvinov placed opposite the private's name a notation that he was on leave, but problems began on the fourth. Col M. Serkov called in the warrant officer and upbraided him severely, demanding why he had failed to report that Lieutenant Reshetov had exceeded his authority. The warrant officer tried to explain. The conversation became heated. Litvinov, without asking permission, turned on his heels and left the office.... Soon after this incident he was discharged into the reserves.

At the present time many people feel that the detachment commander simply decided to get rid of a hot-tempered subordinate. The matter is more complicated, however. Typical shortcomings in indoctrination work with warrant officers were clearly reflected in the Litvinov affair. On the surface everything seemed to be going well. The detachment commander personally conducts classes in the warrant officer political training group. Classes are held on a regular basis, with full attendance. Political information sessions are specially organized for warrant officers. At the end of the week they get together for meetings. Other activities are also conducted. But unfortunately their effectiveness is poor. Many warrant officers fail to display an example in performance of duty, discipline, and have their pay docked.

"For some reason warrant officers do not sign up with us," state the detachment's officers in puzzlement. "And those whose service we extend do not display exemplary conduct."

They recall the case of V. Kiryak. Last year he was "persuaded" to stay on as a warrant officer ("We were stuck with him!"), and by this year he has incurred four disciplinary punishments for being away from his duties without permission and for gross violation of regulations.

The impression is created that in this detachment punishment is the sole method of indoctrination. Of course strict measures must be taken against persons who violate regulations, but we should not forget that these measures are extreme. Abuse of disciplinary punishments attests first and foremost to weakness of explanatory and indoctrinational work with personnel.

This is especially clearly evident in the example of WO N. Kirusha. In just a year's time he has received four punishments, and he has been warned twice about proper performance of duties. The reason is a drinking problem. Could it be that there are no good points in this warrant officer's job performance and character? No, the people in the detachment state that he knows production well, has submitted several valuable efficiency innovation suggestions, and in the past has even been elected to the post of Komsomol committee secretary. When did they overlook this person? They cannot come up with an answer to this question. And apparently they are not looking for one.

The fact is that there is a unique "nutrient medium" in the detachment which fosters various violations of regulations. These include first and foremost a

low level of organization of warrant officer on-duty and off-duty activities. Instead of being teachers and indoctrinators of the military construction workers, they are performing the job of escorts: they accompany their men to a construction job -- and that is it. The warrant officers have essentially nothing to do until the end of the workday.

The situation is additionally complicated by lack of housing for warrant officers and their families. Even those who have served 10 years in the detachment have no idea when they will be assigned housing. We should also state that no warrant officer council has yet been established in the detachment or in the work supervisor's office.

It is true that the people in the detachment attempt to explain away the generously meted punishments as strict demandingness and high principles. But is this the case? Take Litvinov, for example. On eight occasions he was punished for excessive fondness for alcohol, and at the same time, when greeting him following a successful "trip," nobody would draw attention to the fact that Litvinov had vodka on his breath. "I had a simple approach to dealing with people," Litvinov himself acknowledged. "I would not visit anybody without a bottle."

It is naive to assume that the people in the detachment did not know about this "method." Some even openly sympathized. Look how hard this fellow works for the common good. Captain Teplyuk, requesting that Litvinov be transferred to him, confessed: "He has a minor drinking problem, but what a worker!" The company commander is not alone in this opinion. The party organization also has a liberal, indulgent attitude toward "those who drink but work hard." Suffice it to say that the party bureau has not once discussed the question of improving indoctrination work with warrant officers and strengthening discipline among them.

Of course all this by no means justifies the actions of violators of military regulations. No matter how difficult the conditions in which a serviceman finds himself, he must bear firmly in mind the duty and honor of the defender of the homeland and display an example in performance of duty and behavior. And he who forgets the truism is on the wrong road. Even Litvinov's letter to the editors contained the following statement: "I was working hard not to please my superiors but because I thought that this was necessary." What does he mean by "necessary"? To obtain hard-to-get materials by semi-legal means, to put it mildly? The fact is that one would like to say to the author of the letter: you are a hypocrite, Comrade Litvinov. It is too bad that you lack the courage to acknowledge your own errors.

As I was about to depart from the detachment, I learned about a violation of military regulations by Sr Lt V. Ovchinnikov and his warrant officers. On the following day, however, they unblinkingly denied their participation in the unworthy conduct. And neither the detachment commander nor his deputy for political affairs chastised them or called them on the carpet. One cannot help but ask where it is, that strict demandingness and genuine high principledness?

Uniform Violations Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 81 p 4

[Article by Maj I. Omedinskiy, Izhevsk: "Unpardonable Violations"]

[Text] When I have been off the post of the garrison in which I serve I have unfortunately encountered on numerous occasions military personnel who were committing uniform violations. I never expected, however, to encounter such things in Moscow: the fine traditions of many of the units and military educational institutions of the Moscow garrison are well known, and the military commandant's office here has considerable capability to maintain proper order and discipline. Nevertheless I have fairly frequently seen on the city streets enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers dressed in a slovenly fashion, and sometimes in gross violation of regulations. Taken-in trousers, uniform jackets, nonregulation shoes and socks. On some their hair was sloppily combed. And the most incredible "palette" of badges and emblems.

The sight inspires both sadness and indignation. For observance of the regulations governing wearing of the military uniform is not only for the sake of military aesthetics but is also evidence of the discipline of military personnel. A neatly dressed soldier of smart appearance also as a rule behaves in a corresponding fashion. And the first thing one thinks about when seeing persons violating uniform regulations is their commanders, their immediate superiors, who were not concerned about how their subordinates would look off the post. This is an unforgivable error of omission.

This does not happen in our subunit. Before allowing a serviceman to depart on a duty assignment, on leave, as well as upon discharge of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers into the reserve, all officers and noncommissioned officers closely scrutinize the external appearance of personnel. Spotted deficiencies are immediately corrected. We use all available means to instill in the men affection for and a respectful attitude toward the military uniform. We are therefore confident that we shall never be caused embarrassment over our men.

I also feel that MP patrols are not adequately utilized in this important matter. On my above-mentioned arrival in Moscow, I saw in Sokol'niki Park a patrol failing to react to the appearance of soldiers wearing uniforms which were clearly recut to be "stylish." A report to the unit to which a violator is assigned as a rule causes an improvement in indoctrination work with military personnel. Most frequently patrols intervene, however, only when papers are not in order or when a gross disciplinary violation has occurred.

A serviceman's appearance is one indicator of his discipline, personal organization, and level of culture. It is necessary to make every effort to ensure that each and every enlisted man, noncommissioned officer, warrant officer and commissioned officer display an example of proper observance of uniform regulations and be neat and smart in appearance at all times.

Service Caps

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 81 p 2

[News item: "Insignia"]

[Text] Pursuant to an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, changes have been made in certain military personnel insignia. In particular a uniform -- steel-blue -- color of shoulder boards has been established for the dress overcoats of warrant officers, regardless of combat arm (service), with the exception of Navy warrant officers, who shall continue to wear black shoulder boards with piping of the appropriate color: red for warrant officers of shore units and naval infantry, and light blue for naval aviation.

Term of Enrollment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 81 p 2

[News item: "Term of Enrollment Shortened"]

[Text] Regulations covering enrollment and study at military higher educational institutions by warrant officers have been partially changed. Warrant officers not more than 23 years of age are entitled to enroll at these educational institutions after completion of two years of service in duty assignments of warrant officers or performing officer duty assignments. A three-year curriculum has been established for warrant officers at a number of command schools and rear services schools. These educational institutions include the following: the Omsk Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni M. V. Frunze; the Tyumen' Higher Military Engineer Command School imeni Mar Engr Trps A. I. Proshlyakov; the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School imeni 50th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution; the Odessa Higher Artillery Command School imeni M. V. Frunze; the Vol'sk Higher Military Rear Services School imeni Lenin Komsomol; plus several other higher military schools.

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AIR FORCES

TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Bomber Support of Ground Operations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 81 p 1

[Article by Capt V. Samorodov, military navigator 1st class, Red Banner Baltic M.D.: "The Airmen Kept Their Word"]

[Text] "The withdrawing enemy, in an attempt to recapture the initiative, has concentrated tanks and manpower on a prepared line. Enemy antiaircraft missiles and fighter groups are covering this line. Our mission is to find, attack, and destroy the enemy reserves and clear the way for the advancing troops."

With his pointer the regimental commander marked off the region on the map where, according to reconnaissance information, the forces for the counter-attack were assembling. The pilots and navigators of the squadron commanded by Lt Col N. Neshkumay made notes in their work notebooks. All the details of the alternative actions and ways of overcoming enemy air defense weapons were discussed.

We have established a practice in our regiment of performing all missions with a complex tactical background, in a fast-changing situation. Reorientation is increasingly done while planes are in the air. In this situation we, the crew navigators, must be as alert and carefully prepared for flights as possible. This was also true at the particular squadron flight tactical exercise we are describing.

The bomber followed its assigned route exactly. The last orientation marker was passed. Soon the bombing range would appear. It was necessary now to detect the target at the assigned time, attack it, and destroy it on the first run. I performed the calculations and worked with the equipment. The aircraft was confidently controlled by crew commander Maj V. Gritsenko. We made one anti-missile maneuver after another. After a short time more we delivered our bomb strike against the enemy target.

After landing we learned that the crew of military pilot 1st class Maj L. Omel'yanenko had scored especially high on this day. Their bombs were exactly on target! Much of the credit for the precision of this strike goes, of course, to navigator 1st class Capt V. Latyshev. Immediately after returning from the

range he told the other navigators how to score such direct hits with six bombs.

Quick dissemination and persistent introduction of the know-how of the leaders is one of the principal missions outlined by squadron political workers Maj Yu. Dem'yanov and Capt I. Baranov, secretary of the party organization, for party political support of flight work. The experience of this exercise proved to be of great practical value. It concluded an important phase of training and its results had a large impact on the overall evaluation. Jumping ahead for a minute, I will note that the airmen kept their word. All the officers fulfilled their obligations to raise class ratings. The average score for bombing missions rose significantly.

But how it could be otherwise? After all, all our pilots and navigators are communists and highly rated specialists.

Still, know-how does not come by itself. It takes hard work. One cannot become a skilled navigator immediately. A group of new officers that had just graduated from school arrived in our unit. They had only one desire: to become involved in flying as soon as possible. But some of them underestimated the importance of ground drills and did not work hard enough at training periods to improve their theoretical knowledge. Then in the very first days of flying the experienced instructors showed the new airmen what this can lead to. Lt V. Murav'yev, for example, was uncertain how to work in the automatic bombing mode and as a result the attack was significantly off target. Additional work had to be done with the lieutenant.

Here is another example. Some of the new men complained about the strict sequence of work with sights. Officer Ye. Makarov, an experienced navigator, used a trainer to demonstrate what violations of the order of operations in working with the equipment can lead to and related an instructive episode from the experience of Maj Yu. Dem'yanov. The flights on the day in question were being conducted in complex weather conditions. While approaching the assigned region Dem'yanov detected a malfunction in the automatic antenna rotation mechanism. The skilled navigator quickly replaced one of the fuses. He checked again and the sight was working normally. Using it the officer quickly found the target and dropped his bombs with great accuracy.

"Find, attack, and destroy." Our leading navigators Maj V. Pivovarov and Capt V. Pletnev have assimilated this three-word formula very well. They take a very responsible attitude toward each training period and towards study of the equipment; they maintain their special gear in exemplary condition and keep their flight logs accurately. Regular drills during flight and the working harmony of the crew enable them to minimize the time that the aircraft is in its bombing run.

There are more and more of these crews, who use the aircraft equipment fully and skillfully when flying in difficult weather conditions and destroy targets on the run, without fail.

Air Rescue Service Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Maj-Engr O. Bobrakov: "Distress Signal on the Air — The Everyday Life of the Air Search and Rescue Service"]

[Text] The electronic beam of the display smoothly made circle after circle, leaving behind a scattering of target markers. Flights were underway.

The flight control officer listened to the reports of the pilots in the air and issued his instructions in a calm, precise manner. In short, it was ordinary work. Suddenly alongside one of the markers there appeared a glowing arc. Noise? No, it was something quite different.

The officer picked up the telephone and reported to higher headquarters: "In N region call sign 237 is in trouble. Coordinates are azimuth — 190, distance — 70."

In less than an hour a helicopter delivering the rescued man was already rattling over the airfield. I should say that it was not a real rescue, but simply a drill. Maybe that is why the work of the search and rescue service did not seem that difficult to me at the time.

The next day it was different. An An-12 plane with six pairs of airborne troops took off. The target and route of flight were known to a small group of persons.

"Look here," Maj A. Syrchin said, unfolding a map which showed several oblasts. "The circles mark six points. Our airborne troops will go to them, in pairs to be safe. They will represent men in trouble, needing rescue. The distance between the points is hundreds of kilometers. No one knows where they are located."

A yellow light went on in the cargo compartment as a signal to get ready. The freight hold doors opened and on the signal "Move out!" two jumpers fell swiftly downward. They were simulating a crew that had abandoned its aircraft. At the same time the commander on board the An-12, military pilot 1st class Lt Col A. Fedotov, immediately threw the appropriate switch. (In an actual situation this is done by the men abandoning the aircraft.) A distress signal went out on the air, causing the glowing arcs to appear on the display screens.

The signal lasted 30 seconds (this is about how long the distress equipment in a plane abandoned by the pilot works). Only half a minute, but in this time the signal had to be not just received and recognized, but also processed to determine its azimuth and distance. If this is not done the subsequent search will be very complicated. Next signals came over the air in the form of a staccato tone automatically given off by the emergency radio beacon carried by the parachutist on his descent. These signals are received at the command post (before the parachutist is in their zone of visibility) and the bearing to them is determined.

The flight continued. At intervals of 15, 20, and 40 minutes the plane dropped the other pairs of parachutists. Below us the pastures, marshes, populated points, forests, and mountains floated by.

After the last pair had been dropped the An-12 headed back for a landing. Putting together the flight time and speed I realized the enormous area over which the "distress victims" were spread and how difficult it would be to find them among the forests and marshes.

WO [Praporshchik] V. Frolov and Pvt V. Nechekhova, with the call number 228, were the last to jump from the airplane. Before they had gathered up their parachutes Capt Ye. Antipov, military pilot 1st class and commander of the search helicopter, was taking off. In addition to the crew the rescue group on board included WO V. Zarechnyuk, medical assistant WO V. Pokidanets, and Pvt E. Voronin. After a few minutes the helicopter commander went on the air, "228! 228! This is 349. Do you hear me?" The helicopter approached the assigned search region. The approximate coordinates were known from the bearing determined by the radio direction finder.

Warrant Officer Frolov removed the yellow plastic case. He set up the antenna, transmitted the distress message in the established manner, then switched the tiny radio set to receive.

They did not have to wait long. Within 20 minutes the commander of the search helicopter came through on the radio.

"I can hear you fine," the man on the ground answered. "My location is..."

"How do you feel? Do you need medical help?"

"Thank you, no. Everything is normal."

"Turn on your radio beacon."

A few brief movements of the keys on the case of the emergency radio and signals began to be transmitted. Now the helicopter could find the men "in trouble" by means of radio compass.

One hour after leaving their dropped aircraft the "victims" V. Frolov and V. Nechekhova were delivered to the assembly airfield.

When our An-12 taxied off the runway I could hardly believe my eyes. Several of the airborne pairs we had dropped hundreds of kilometers away were calmly relaxing on the grass.

Noticing my surprise, Major Syrchin spoke, as if continuing the conversation began earlier:

"Machinery is good as machinery. But in the end, everything is decided by people who have mastered its use. We have top specialists here, both the men

on the ground and the helicopter crews and search groups. It is important to strive for complete working coordination between them. That is why we hold drills like the one today, and in a situation that maximally approximates combat, with no simplifications.

"Our airborne troops help create such a situation. The first jumpers today were international sport masters WO V. Valyunas and Sr Sgt L. Korycheva. They are world record holders. The other jumpers were also sport masters. Their work demands high qualifications. They have to jump everywhere, into forests and swamps, mountains, and populated points."

This is how the search and rescue service headed by officer G. Konev entered the summer period of combat training. The specialists face difficult and important missions. Their success in accomplishing them will be largely determined by the level of training of the subunits, which is achieved by long, hard practice.

Caption to photograph [not reproduced]. The crew of a rescue helicopter (left to right) — pilot-navigator Sr Lt A. Sidorov, flight engineer Sr Lt Yu. Dobrynin, and crew commander Capt Ye. Antipov.

Bomber Attack Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Onufritsov, squadron commander and military pilot 1st class, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "Surprise Bomb Strike"]

[Text] The regimental commander gave the squadron its mission: Strike an assemblage of enemy manpower and equipment in its concentration area. So they faced a flight into the enemy rear, over hostile territory. But before that they would have to cross the front line. In short, it was not an easy mission.

I went over some details of the upcoming mission with the flight commanders. From the chief of staff I found out whether the line of the front had changed and if there was information on regrouping of enemy air defense weapons. I studied the best approaches to the target. Captains V. Pletnev, S. Chekanov, and V. Dudnikov were concentrated and attentive. Difficult flight assignments were an ordinary thing for them. It was not the first time they had led flights. They were experienced men, each permeated with a great sense of responsibility for the outcome of the flight tactical exercise.

The tactical situation became clearer. I adopted a plan: to reach the target from the hillside, secretly, to attack on the run by individual aircraft with electronic countermeasures to enemy air defense weapons. I warned the crew commander that the targets were carefully camouflaged, the terrain hilly, and the firing positions reliably covered. Maximum concentration and readiness for any unexpected turn of events would be essential. To achieve surprise we would have to be bold.

Now it was up to the flight commanders to carry out the overall plan, prepare the pilots, and figure out the most effective way to hit the target. I saw how carefully they analyzed the weather information. The weather above the airfield was cold and clear. But the target was covered by heavy clouds. I wanted to suggest to my subordinates a way to sight and bomb under these conditions, but I controlled the impulse because I knew that it would infringe on the initiative and independence of the flight commanders. Let them figure it out themselves.

They thought about it and decided to bomb the target using the radar sight while out of the visibility zone. If weather conditions were to permit detection of the concentration of manpower and equipment, they would be using the optical sight. This would also insure highly accurate bombing. I was pleased by the solid thinking behind my subordinates' plan. This plan immediately acquired the force of an order. The chief of staff wrote it up on a map. In the last minutes before takeoff we went over minor details and ran through the possible alternatives with changes in the air situation one more time. But who could tell how the actual situation would shape up? Readiness for any unexpected development is always a reliable ally of the pilot.

We flew over the taiga. I led the group along a well-studied line of ground orientation markers. Without them it is difficult to fly at low altitude. Pilots at the front, of course, delivered precise bomb strikes for this very reason, that they had a perfect knowledge of the region of combat operations.

Following this tradition, while still on the ground we took a close look at every orientation marker that could be distinguished. And now from one of them I could recognize that we were approaching the line of the front. There was a possibility of action by enemy air defense weapons there. The duties of detecting and suppressing them were distributed among the different crews. Some were assigned to scout while others were ready to put the jamming equipment to work, and still others were prepared to strike enemy radar and missile installations.

But it did not come to this. It appeared that our accurate reconnaissance information enabled us to set a successful course to the enemy rear, making skillful use of the characteristics of the rugged terrain.

The target was near now. After a few more minutes of flying I ordered the pairs to break formation and prepare for individual bombing runs. But just then we received an input — what is a flight tactical exercise without one! The sighting equipment on V. Pletnev's plane was "damaged." It was clear that the pilot would not be able to drop his bombs on his own. What should we do? Order the crew to return to the airfield carrying the bombs? This was no answer. Better to look for a way to fulfill the assignment. That is exactly what pilots at the front did. Their guiding purpose was to inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy. They never returned to base carrying ammunition. But what should we do? In just a few seconds we would be going into the bombing runs. The target was concealed by clouds.

I ordered Pletnev to remain in formation. He would drop his bombs on the command of the lead plane. I could feel, better than see, how Pletnev's airplane pulled closer to mine. He knew from experience that the precision of the bombing and grouping of the hits depended greatly on this. The two of us headed for one target! We aimed and then dropped the bombs. The string of bombs fell and we flew wing-to-wing over the enemy positions, which were soon covered by the smoke of the explosions. One after another the remaining crews of the squadron bombed the target with equal precision.

At the review later there would be a short discussion. Capt S. Chekanov, secretary of the party organization, would congratulate the communists of the squadron on their successful actions at the exercise and fulfilling all the obligations taken on for the exercise. But that would be later. Now, just coming out of the cockpit, I removed my pressure helmet and with pleasure held out my sweating face to the fresh breeze blowing from the low hill sinking into the summer twilight. I was in a fine mood, a fighting mood.

Shortcomings in Training Noted

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col L. Goncharov, squadron commander and military pilot 1st class: "Duty Flight"]

[Text] No sooner had the signal sounded than the airmen of the duty flight were racing toward their planes. Then quickly Capt A. Klintsov, commander of the four planes, reported by radio: "Ready for takeoff!" Within a few minutes the high-speed, maneuvering enemy target had been intercepted in the stratosphere and destroyed.

The skill of the flight commander and his subordinates, their great sense of responsibility for protecting our air frontiers, and their thorough understanding of the importance of their missions had its effect.

These are precisely the factors we consider in structuring indoctrination work with those who are assigned to the duty flight, factors such as the necessity of constantly improving combat skill and showing vigilance and the desire to achieve victory over the enemy at any cost, no matter what tricks he may employ.

Two-thirds of the pilots in the squadron have first class ratings, and the rest are second class. This enables us to make high demands for the results of personnel training and to evaluate them by the strict measure of contemporary warfare. We try to train the men above all with positive examples, using broad propaganda for the achievement of leaders in socialist competition and experience from front operations. At the same time we draw important lessons from everyday failures in training and our own shortcomings. We oppose every type of simplification and indulgence which may harm the training of the airmen and reduce their ability to correctly evaluate the fighting capacities of the enemy.

This is precisely the demanding approach we used in evaluating the intercept performed by Sr Lt A. Khaletskiy, a fairly experienced pilot. He attacked the target at the assigned line with determination and launched his missile accurately. We would expect that this would be a satisfactory outcome to the aerial duel. But an analysis of the data from flight recorders revealed a different picture. It turned out that the target did not maneuver, that the enemy behaved passively. That is why it was easy for Khaletskiy to intercept it. Lt I. Medvedev, the combat control officer, was "helping" the pilot.

We found out later that the lieutenant was concentrating all his attention on controlling the interceptor, and forgot that he was playing the enemy. Unfortunately Sr Lt P. Semkin, the chief of the command post who was with Medvedev, did not intervene and correct him. Needless to say, this "helping hand" to the interceptor became the subject of serious discussion with the officers of the command post. Khaletskiy was not given credit for the intercept.

The squadron is working hard to combat cases of carelessness and indifference. Some of the airmen are sometimes inclined to consider their mistakes and omissions "trivial" things which do not represent the level of training of the pilot or command post. In a real battle, they say, with a real enemy all their skills will be put to use. But we have long been aware of the serious consequences that may follow from inadequate training and a habit of taking it easy and being content with past achievements. All these things come from complacency, a belief that the highest levels of skill have already been attained. It is plain that such attitudes cannot be tolerated.

During a certain flight Capt D. Patraman did not turn on the camera that recorded the aircraft sighting screen. "I forgot it," the officer said, shrugging his shoulders. Everyone understands that the outcome of a real battle would not be affected by such a mistake. It simply made it difficult to monitor the results of a missile duel. This forgetfulness is nothing else but carelessness, which can always lead to other violations.

Experience shows that the forgetfulness and inattention of a specialist are always the results of certain mistakes in organizing the training and indoctrination process. We reviewed Captain Patraman's mistake from this point of view (incidentally, the captain had earlier committed another violation of flight laws and regulations). A thorough analysis led to the conclusion that there had been shortcomings in the organization of drills during the preparation of pilots to go on combat duty and mistakes in monitoring their readiness for flying. Concrete steps were taken to improve the flying skills of airmen assigned to the duty flight.

In particular, we changed slightly the way we conducted brief tactical drills in the flight before going on combat duty. Formerly these drills had been a matter of solving input problems in a classroom. It was hard at such drills to create the atmosphere of fast-moving battle in order to make the officers think creatively and respond quickly to changes in the air situation. At the suggestion of flight commander Capt A. Lukashov, the methodology for conducting the drills was somewhat modified. The officers now practice solving tactical problems in a

specially equipped area that recreates the flight region. Making the conditions of training periods resemble more closely the situation in the air in which the fighter plane will have to operate and using the technique of running through alternatives helps check the tactical usefulness of the particular model of aerial battle.

The party organization headed by Sr Lt I. Solodyuk works hard to instill vigilance and raise the sense of personal responsibility of the men going on combat duty. One of their especially important activities is seeing that communists set an example in performance of missions in the duty flight. I recall the party meeting held early in the year at which this question was put directly and considered. At that time Solodyuk proposed studying and generalizing the practices of the airmen in the squadron commanded by guards Lt Col V. Bukreyev when serving combat duty as a flight. He was attracted by the fact that the personnel of this subunit always handled their duty missions in an exemplary manner. How were they able to do so?

This was the same question that concerned deputy squadron commander Maj G. Pofanov, political worker Capt A. Vitebskiy, and flight commander Capt A. Lukashov, who went to see the leaders. Soon they had learned many useful things from their neighbors and rivals in competition. For example, they learned about organizing the combined work of pilots and technicians. We all know how important every second is between the command "Air!" and the takeoff. Bukreyev's subordinates have figured everything out down to the smallest detail, down to points such as the best way to set up the ladder to the pilot's cockpit and how to place the pressure helmet. By using many efficient techniques borrowed from our neighbors we were able to surpass the standard for taking off from duty status at the airfield by almost 10 percent.

As for ideological and psychological training of airmen going onto the duty flight, it is a creative process. The most harmful thing here is a sporadic campaign-type approach. Therefore, we do this work every day, on a planned basis. Before going on duty it usually picks up. We consider political information sessions, a proven form of indoctrination, to be very important; they make it possible to show the full complexity of the contemporary international situation and reveal the treacherous tricks of the imperialist aggressors. In their work party and Komsomol activists use technical propaganda equipment whenever possible and bring the most important press and radio messages to their fellow servicemen quickly.

Of course, none of these forms are new. But we do not think it is a question of the novelty of the methods of influencing the hearts and minds of our personnel. The main thing is for all the activities to carry an important indoctrination message and inspire the fighting men to perform the missions of combat duty in a zealous and exemplary manner.

Improving Flight Safety by Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Col V. Ivannikov, military pilot 1st class, Red Banner Baltic M.D.:
"But the Flight Commanders Stood Aside"]

[Text] Sometime ago the fighter aviation regimentation was engaged in intensive flight work and it was observed that Senior Lieutenants M. Levin and L. Kopot' sometimes made mistakes in landing. This was especially upsetting because these officers are military pilots second class. Therefore, they should have adequate practical skills and flying errors are simply unforgivable for them.

What was wrong? The matter was investigated and it was learned that the main reason was mistakes in the methodology of training these officers. Indeed, they had made mistakes in controlling the aircraft during landing earlier too. But what was the response to this by those who were instructing the young pilots? Of course, they analyzed the mistakes and pointed out shortcomings in their flying technique; but they did not do everything possible to eliminate the problems. What is more, they gave their "okay" for the pilots to go on to the next exercises in the air. Undoubtedly both Levin and Kopot' themselves were aware of their weak points in personal training and tried to overcome the mistakes. But desire alone, of course, is not enough.

Who is supposed to help officers identify the true causes of their mistakes and get rid of them? Needless to say, for a pilot the first teacher should be his flight commander. As his direct superior and flight training instructor, the flight commander is fully entrusted to train airmen to perform each flight assignment and to wage aerial battle skillfully under any conditions. Lieutenants expect the flight commander to be a man capable of saving them from making mistakes, one who will offer suggestions and corrections. He is the one who must give thorough answers to all questions which a pilot may have.

But the airmen in the flight commanded by Capt V. Vikulov did not always feel that the concern and attention were there. Captain Vikulov was sometimes absent during drill work by those pilots who needed the skilled help of their primary instructor. Why did this officer sometimes evade, I would say, performance of his direct duties, which as we see had a bad effect on the training of his subordinates?

It is common knowledge that in order to teach others the leader himself must know and be able to do a great deal. Therefore, he must not only possess all the necessary knowledge, but also have mastered effective methodological techniques and teaching skills so that he can demonstrate the particular elements of flying and controlling aircraft to his trainees.

These were the very qualities that Captain Vikulov lacked. His personal flight methodological training was not adequate, and without this pilots cannot be properly trained. Because he was afraid of revealing his methodological shortcomings before his subordinates, he avoided drills. Now we begin to understand the reason for the problems that Levin and Kopot' had in landing.

But possibly the shortcomings in the methodological training of their immediate superior, the flight commander, were nonetheless a revelation to his commander and the other executive officers? You cannot get a clear-cut answer to this question. After all, when Vikulov was promoted to his position we must suppose that his capability for instruction work was thoroughly evaluated. But it turns out that they missed some things. But this is not the whole story in this case.

In our units most squadron commanders are officers who have graduated from higher military schools, have adequate command experience, and work hard. And still they often take on almost all the work of direct pilot training and try to become personally acquainted with each pilot. The result of this excessive involvement is to exclude the other flight commanders from active participation in the training and indoctrination process; they are left to themselves. They gradually begin to feel less personally responsible for the training of the airmen subordinate to them, because the range of duties they perform has been artificially narrowed. Nor do they show themselves to be skillful organizers of socialist competition.

This is exactly what happened with Captain Vikulov. In reality none of the squadron leaders, specifically not his commander Maj V. Duz', kept close track of the training of Vikulov himself and his work with subordinates. Furthermore, no one gave him the necessary help to master solid teaching skills. This resulted in a low methodological level in training periods on simulation and aircraft equipment in the flight and superficial analysis of mistakes by flight personnel.

It is true that after discovering the gaps in the flight commander's activity, squadron leaders improved their monitoring of the training of airmen and took a number of steps to step up the campaign for flight safety and eliminate possible causes of air accidents.

There is no question that the flight commander must work hard to improve his own methodological skills to meet the demands made of him. But is this always true?

At a certain flight tactical exercise Capt V. Gurov and the airmen of the flight he commanded performed very well. But a short time later during ordinary flights the same Gurov, a military pilot first class, suddenly committed a flagrant mistake that could have caused an air accident.

He was taking off after another missile plane, at a definite time interval, and raised his undercarriage at too low an altitude. Was this accidental carelessness? No, Gurov had obviously overestimated himself and decided that with his flight qualifications he could do anything. During preflight preparation he did not trouble himself to review the technique of taking off in a pair; he paid no attention to mistakes made by other pilots earlier or to ways to correct them.

I believe that these examples speak for themselves. The flight methodological training of each flight commander, especially the new ones, must be a constant concern. But help and monitoring can be overdone. If certain officers forget this, they deprive themselves of effective helpers. Experience confirms

that squadron commanders who try to take on the duties of flight commanders in addition to their own direct duties cannot handle everything and ultimately find themselves unable to manage all these jobs.

The experience of leading units shows that if the flight commander performs his duties in full, he will not allow an unprepared pilot to fly. This by itself is a reliable safeguard against possible causes of flight accidents owing to pilot error. All work to train aerial fighters must be structured in precisely this direction.

How can we see that the flight commander becomes a real teacher to the pilots and the squadron commander's primary helper in performing the missions of flight training and insuring flight safety? We are obviously not revealing anything new if we say that the main thing is to see that the leadership personnel of the squadron and the regiment devote constant attention to raising the level of flight methodological training of the flight commanders and always demand high standards of them. Help and monitoring and regular exchange of work know-how will promote successful performance of flight safety missions.

Importance of Good Relations in Aircrew

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col N. Morokhovets, deputy commander of an air force regiment and military pilot 1st class: "In One Crew"]

[Text] At first no one in the squadron would have doubted that pilot Guards Sr Lt S. Tolmachev and navigator Guards Lt V. Kameliyev would make a good team. No question of it! They were both knowledgeable and skillful specialists who performed their duties outstandingly. But then the regular training got underway and it soon became clear that the crew was not meeting expectations. They made mistakes in performing their flight missions.

Why was this? What had happened to the unusual flying skill of Tolmachev and Kameliyev's good grasp of the navigator's work? At first people thought that they simply had not "meshed" yet, that they were not familiar enough with each other's professional and personal qualities. But more time passed and the situation did not improve. And then one day after a shift of flying the squadron commander, very annoyed, came over to me and asked for advice about this crew. They are too different, he said, just listen to how they talk to each other in the air.

So the squadron commander and I listened to the radio communications between Tolmachev and Kameliyev in the air several times. There was plainly a certain tension in their dialog while flying. The pilot, a temperamental type by nature, rushed the somewhat slow navigator in making his calculations when there was no particular need for it. The navigator hurried and, as a result, made mistakes, which drew a sharp comment from the crew commander. Their relations on the ground, during joint preparation for flights and in ordinary dealings could not be considered good either.

At a session of the section on moral-psychological training of the methods council headed by Guards Col V. Alekseyev, we carefully analyzed the behavior of Tolmachev and Kameliyev. It turned out that one of the reasons for the problem was inadequate indoctrination work with these young officers. Conclusions were drawn from this, of course. But in the interests of the work, we still had to decide the question of the composition of this crew. Getting ahead for a minute, I will say that later when Tolmachev and Kameliyev began flying in other crews they always received high scores for performance of combat missions.

I knew from my own experience that establishing correct mutual relations in a crew is a subtle and delicate matter and one should not be in a hurry to draw conclusions about it. There are many examples where, for example, a specialist will try to use psychological incompatibility to cover up his own weak points in professional training or mistakes that are his fault personally.

I recall navigator Guards Sr Lt A. Nesterenko, who once made a mistake in his calculations and did not perform the aimed bombing successfully. He stated, "The pilot and I cannot get along. Transfer me to a different crew."

It was possible to do so in the unit, and others were glad to have the navigator. But soon Nesterenko began to make mistakes in his new place too. But he gave the same explanation: psychological incompatibility with the pilot. We did not transfer him to a third crew. Instead the squadron commander and his deputy for political affairs took a closer look at Nesterenko's behavior and his relations with fellow servicemen. They concluded that flaws in the navigator's own personality were responsible for all the problems.

A personal talk was held and his senior comrades bluntly told the officer what his shortcomings were and gave him advice on how to get rid of them. It is to Nesterenko's credit that this time he evaluated his own behavior correctly. He began to demand more of himself and became more attentive to the opinion of his comrades. After a time the navigator's affairs began to improve. He is now an outstanding specialist and has been promoted.

I am firmly convinced that such qualities as mutual understanding and a feeling of respect develop and grow stronger in a business-like atmosphere of joint work where each individual is aware of his responsibility for success in performing the missions that face the military collective. Let me refer to an example from my own experience.

At the time when I was just a young pilot crews were being formed and I very much wanted to "get" Sr Lt Mikhail Ivanov as my navigator. He had been my neighbor and our families were friends. In short, we knew each other well. But the unit commander, for some reasons of his own, appointed a different officer as navigator of the crew. I will admit honestly that at first he seemed much too lethargic and reacted very slowly to criticism of mistakes made in flight. Sometimes this put me on edge, and things came to the point where I asked the commander to free me from this navigator. The words which he said in response are with me to this day.

"Now don't you think this is simply shallow thinking on your part?" the commander asked sternly. "After all, you hardly know this man at all, but you are already suggesting some kind of psychological incompatibility. Take a minute and picture this situation. Combat operations are underway. The navigator who suited you in every respect has been critically wounded. Will you refuse to go into battle with another navigator who for some reason does not suit you right away?"

This conversation forced me to do a great deal of thinking. After it I took a different, stricter and more self-critical attitude toward mistakes made in my unsettled relations with the navigator. When he made mistakes we discussed them in a calm atmosphere. Incidentally, the navigator made many useful suggestions to me too. Why conceal it, at that time I was by no means a master pilot. The comradely demandingness and helpfulness was very useful to us both. We flew together for a total of five years, longer than any other crew in the squadron. My combat comrade later graduated from the military academy. He is now the senior navigator of a regiment in a different district. I have the warmest and most friendly memories of him.

It was these relations, which were so hard at first, that taught me and, certainly, my former navigator to be more patient and attentive to other people, not to draw hasty conclusions, and to be able to find the good in a person.

What I have said above certainly does not mean that a formalistic approach can be taken to the formation of crews, hoping that in time everything will fall into place, the crew members will get used to each other. Although psychological incompatibility is rare, it does occur, and the personal traits of the specialists cannot ever be forgotten in composing crews. Have we done everything correctly in this area? No, not everything.

For example, sometimes we chose the wrong basis for making up a crew. We studied the qualities of the men based on documents received from their previous places of service and took the results of brief personal observation into account. Of course, we also considered the level of professional training of each individual. But we learned that this was not enough.

When determining candidates for work together in a crew today, we make a thorough study of their work and psychological characteristics, especially their character and inclination to interpersonal relations. In other words, we try to determine whether the officers are capable of finding a common language and how well developed each one's sense of mutual understanding and collectivism is. Comparing the findings of the analysis helps us select the optimal composition for the particular crew.

These were precisely the qualities that were considered in making up the crews consisting of pilots Guards Lieutenants V. Metaker and D. Koynov and navigators Guards Lieutenants V. Makarov and A. Ryzhikhin. They developed psychological and working compatibility almost immediately, from the first flights together.

Nonetheless, teamwork in combat action is not achieved immediately, even where the crews are carefully selected. Success here depends crucially on purposeful

work by the commander and party organization to give the men a high level of ideological toughness and a feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned work.

I would like to refer to the squadron commanded by Guards Lt Col N. Smirnov. This is a smooth-operating, unified military collective. Its high and consistent scores in combat improvement are primarily the result of the fact that the commander and party and Komsomol activists indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of collectivism and high personal responsibility for the common work. They use the force of socialist competition within crews and between them for this purpose and work hard to disseminate the know-how of the leaders and best airmen. During drills on special trainers and on the combat equipment the training leaders focus attention on the quality of the individual preparation of the airmen and improving precision and coordination in their actions during performance of flight assignment.

A skillful crew can handle the most difficult mission. That is why the strengthening of these small military collectives should be a constant concern of party organizations. They must see that the crews have a healthy moral atmosphere in their struggle to improve flying skills and strengthen combat readiness.

New Multipurpose Weapons Trainer Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Malashko: "Trainer Prepares Airmen for Work in the Air"]

[Text] The efficiency workers of the N unit have fabricated an interesting aviation weapons trainer. Using it pilots will be able to practice many complex operations, from loading ammunition to firing all types of weapons against different targets.

Sr Lt K. Olenin, a graduate of the Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, took the initiative to build the trainer. He became interested in electronics while still a cadet at school. He is now a man respected for his creative initiative in the unit, but he still pursues this interest.

Quality of Technical Maintenance

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Lt M. Rashitov, Red Banner Turkestan M.D. "High Tension"]

[Text] The tactical exercise was conducted in a situation maximally approximating that of combat. The aircraft equipment had to be serviced and repaired away from the primary base. This meant many inconveniences resulting from unfamiliar conditions of deployment in the field, sharp temperature differences between day and night, high dust levels, and finally, the limited choice of tools and instruments.

During a short meeting with members of the Komsomol committee I could feel that they too were concerned with how the young fighting men would do in these difficult conditions. The day before the exercise we had a meeting. There was a business-like discussion of the best way to perform the combat training missions. Sr Lt I. Slin'ko, secretary of the Komsomol bureau, proposed that we work in the field under the slogan "A Komsomol Guarantee for the Quality of Equipment Maintenance!" The unit commander supported this initiative.

The electronic equipment group was in a tough situation, having just received new men. WO [Praporshchik] A. Bondarenko, Pvt Kh. Kabirov, and other comrades put in a lot of work to get the newcomers to fit in quickly. At the exercise the young specialists performed their duties successfully and serviced the equipment very well.

Here is an instructive example. A malfunction was found on a plane. In earlier cases it had not been possible to fix it under field conditions and, probably, no one would have criticized the specialists if they had simply announced that they could not do it. But it was their strong desire to make a significant contribution to the general cause that inspired the Komsomol members of the mechanical maintenance group headed by Capt S. Chumak to look for an answer to this difficult problem. They did find one, and the aircraft was able to take place in the combat formation.

The members of the Komsomol committee drew one other useful lesson for themselves during this tense combat training. Creative enterprising approaches to the work by the men should not go unnoticed if the work is to progress well. In their talks, news bulletins, and photographic reports the activists tried to reveal the know-how of the leaders in competition. Examples of unselfish labor inspire young soldiers to work their hardest.

Our mechanical maintenance unit was named best in the district for the results of competition. Many factors helped the collective to succeed. The Komsomol organization makes a significant contribution.

Let me give some more examples. The specialists of the airplane and engine group, following the initiative of Pvt I. Aleksandrov, the Komsomol group organizer, decided to master the skills of performing scheduled maintenance work. This shortened the time required to perform essential operations. Komsomol members of the aircraft equipment group headed by Pvt A. Ganin took on the obligation of raising their ratings and accomplished their goal.

Capt V. Ketov, Sr Lt A. Antonov, and other communists of the unit teach activists to work in creative ways with young people and to identify and support possible new and progressive developments in competition. But of course, all attention cannot be focused on successes. It is also important to eliminate shortcomings in time. There are shortcomings. Not all the Komsomol members themselves are setting an example of good performance. Nor have we been able to get all Komsomol members participating actively in efficiency work.

We can also see other reserves and are trying to put them into use. This helps build up our success during the summer training period and fulfill our obligations in competition.

Fighter Bombing Attack Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Col A. Sorokin: "Ground Attacks by Fighters"]

[Text] Flight work was underway in the Guards Fighter Aviation Proskurov Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov and Aleksandr Nevskiy Regiment imeni Leninskogo Komsomola. The pilots were intercepting high speed maneuvering targets at the full range of altitudes up to the combat ceiling. Tense missile duels and group aerial battles were underway. The attacks were highly productive.

But then Guards Lt Col Gennadiy Stepanovich Zadvinskiy, commander of the aviation regiment, and I began talking about something else: Would his subordinates be able to hit ground targets with the same accuracy?

Anything can happen in contemporary warfare. And the regiment's rich history at the front abounds with cases where it was necessary to send fighters to attack enemy ground positions. But what about today? If the men of a pair, flight, or squadron of contemporary fighters were given the mission of delivering bomb, missile, and strafing attacks against enemy troops on the march or against launch sites, storehouses, and other facilities, would pilots who are used to attacking targets often visible only on the radar screen and flying high in the stratosphere be able to handle this assignment?

"What do you mean? Of course they could," said Gennadiy Stepanovich without a shadow of doubt. "And they would do just as well as fighter bombers."

Perhaps he went too far? After all, fighter bombers specialize in ground attacks.

"Our men are just as good," said Guards Maj Sergey Bezlyudnyy, commander of the first squadron. "And the fighter bomber people have seen this themselves. The deputy regimental commander there is a lieutenant colonel that I went to school with, Onishenko, a sniper pilot. He had nothing but sarcastic comments until we went to their firing range and hit every single target. Moreover, we work without any concessions for our lack of experience in ground attacks."

The officers showed me the conditions and results of that flight tactical exercise. Indeed, it was conducted under complex conditions. The enemy had densely concentrated air defense weapons around the installations. The targets were small in size. The mission was given as follows: Wipe out the ammunition dump with bombs, knock out the missile launchers with unguided missile and cannon fire, and strafe the columns of enemy troops on the march. All of this was to be done in one flight, without permitting a second pass over the target. The planes had to operate from a complex maneuver.

The airmen passed this test brilliantly. All the targets were hit with great accuracy. Guards Majors A. Kudryavtsev and V. Yevgushchenko [sic], Guards Captains A. Artyushkin, V. Shilin, and V. Shirayev, Guards Sr Lt V. Bychkov, and many other pilots demonstrated great tactical and fire skill and distinguished

themselves by accurate hits. Guards Lt Col M. Balashov, flight control officer at the range, catching the exclamations of approval by the airmen of the fighter bomber unit through the roar of the bomb explosions, the staccato rattling of the cannons, and the screaming of the missiles, could not conceal his pride in the skills of his fellow servicemen.

However, it was not the sniper-like accuracy that impressed the fighter bomber men, who are acknowledged masters of ground attacks. What amazed them was how their neighbors could produce such close groupings of hits, especially when bombing. And perhaps the main thing that surprised them was how, with all their everyday fighter missions, were they able to maintain a high level of readiness to operate against ground targets?

Everyone who has observed the fighters in the air knows the answer to the first question. The guardsmen are rightly famous as unsurpassed masters of aerial acrobatics, and perform figures in formation with intervals of no more than 2 meters between planes! So if a closed combat formation is required, for example in group bombing, they make it really tight. That is why every single bomb hit the hypothetical ammunition depot.

But how do the fighter pilots "keep themselves in shape"? I would like to take this up in more detail, because their practices seem useful. As Guards Maj Gennadiy Ivanovich Vasil'yev, unit political worker, says, the problems of intensifying the training process are a constant focus of attention for the methods council and party organization. They see the solutions to these problems in carefully thought-out, multipurpose flights for combat training and in competition to master fire skills. They successfully combine the performance of intercepts and aerial battles with bombing and photo runs against ground targets. To work on this they have arranged a target set-up at the airfield not far from the runway and an officer with a command radio does the flight control work there.

A pilot returning after successful attacks on an aerial target requests authorization not to land, but to circle and attack the ground target. While he does so he is observed by not only the flight control officer but all the pilots not in the air. The experienced ones evaluate him and the young ones learn from him. The training process continues when the photographic materials are analyzed at the flight review.

Combining assignments in this way broadens the scope of tactical training for the airmen, develops their readiness for their immediate operations when re-oriented in the air, reduces the number of combat training flights and thus produces a great economy of fuel, equipment life, and training time.

So the guardsmen's confidence in their fighting capabilities is fully justified. When necessary they can carry out an unexpected combat mission of any level of difficulty to wipe out either aerial or ground targets.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Tank Company Night Firing Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant N. Budayev, tank company commander; "Night Training Exercise"]

[Text] On hearing the order, the officers peered into the hilly terrain lying ahead. The onset of nightfall had complicated the mission considerably. Moreover, this was the first tank night firing exercise in the summer training period.

Taking the lessons of winter training into account, we resolved to make more active use of nighttime to improve personnel combat skills. Of course, this requires more intense attention to the instructional skills of the officers.

In preparing for this training exercise, the exercise theme was thoroughly studied with the officers. The directors at the training sites had provided for practicing various scenarios involving actions under limited visibility conditions. Special attention was paid to organizing competition on missions and normative provisions at night. All these questions were reflected in the plans-outlines.

For example, Lieutenant I. Danilevich, the platoon leader, decided to have the personnel practice skills in loading ammunition in addition to the main problems provided for by the theme of the tank firing exercise. The officer's subordinates had to deal not with just a limited number of tank assemblies and mechanisms, but essentially with all its equipment. Other platoon leaders approached the task creatively too.

The sergeants were also given an active role. In particular, an additional training point was provided for whereby the crew members had to be trained in operating communication equipment under the direction of a specially trained sergeant.

And so, the exercise began. The crews took their places in the tanks. The mechanisms simulating machine movement through rough ground were switched on. The signal lights of the simulated targets flashed in the darkness.... Senior Lieutenant D. Sukhenko and Lieutenants I. Kasimov and I. Danilevich took turns in making up the crews. Their reports on the results of target reconnaissance by infrared equipment observation and the initial settings for firing were heard in the ether. The officers' work was under the special supervision of the director. After all,

the effectiveness of the training exercise and the level of tactical fire training of the whole company would depend on their skills.

The officers' actions left a good impression. For example, while adjusting fire by direction and range, Lieutenant Kasimov displayed the ability to freely vary by different methods: by changing the point of aim to allow for weapon error and wind conditions, by choosing a different sight type or by burst mark. Lieutenant Danilevich did not fall behind his rival in competition either. Their subordinates also rose to the occasion.

The first exercise was over. How successful were we in implementing what was planned and did we make maximum use of the training time? There is no simple answer to this question. While studying the rules of fire and executing the fire missions, Senior Lieutenant Sukhenko did not always manage to properly distribute time and the load on the trainees. There were also some shortcomings in Lieutenant Danilevich's actions. We shall take all this into account to prevent future deficiencies.

Tank Simulator Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Guards Major N. Chernak, regimental chief of staff, Red Banner Belorussian Military District, under the rubric "The Main Thing is Effectiveness and Quality": "On the First Round"]

[Text] Our regimental commander recently carried out this experiment at a firing range. Two platoons competing with each other were placed on opposite sides. The one on the offensive used simulators to perform the fire exercise; the other simulated a suitable alternative of the situation for this exercise. Results of the duel were recorded by objective monitoring instruments. Execution of the fire missions by the crews, calculation of time for firing rounds and other objective data showed that half of those firing, including the platoon leader, would not have had the opportunity for a second round in an actual combat situation. A well-known truth had been clearly confirmed: in modern combat, he who forestalls in fire will be the victor.

Many tactical maneuvers are employed precisely in the interests of effectively striking the enemy by fire. In dealing with range targets or even while operating on tactical exercises and activities, where there are not always strict criteria for assessing the fire superiority of the sides, some officers gradually get accustomed to the thought: "A forestalling round or salvo is fine and one has to strive for this, but an excellent rating will also be given for hitting the target on the second round." The experiment convinced the subunit commanders above all that the campaign to hit targets on the first round at maximum range is a vital requirement in modern combat.

After the experiment, an expanded meeting of the party committee was held; service chiefs and battalion commanders were invited to it. Among priority problems, the communists justly cited improving the quality of planning for exercises. After this meeting, the regimental staff placed under strict supervision the strict adherence to the weekly schedule of conducting in the subunits tank firing training and activities on training facilities.

Special attention was paid to preparing for activities. In particular, a group of officers led by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Izotov, a regimental directorate officer, comprehensively prepares the training sites for each training exercise and firing. This work, in which subunit commanders also take part now, includes adjusting sight mechanisms and weapons and technical preparation of the sliding frames that simulate tank movement, the target ranges and the equipment for communications and objective monitoring of the execution of fire missions. All this allows avoiding pauses in exercises and firings and improving procedures for conducting them.

It has become a rule to combine preparation of weapons and the physical training plant with the search for more expedient instructional methods. Thus, on the firing grounds, there is continual variation of the number of range targets and their maneuvers, the exposure time of the targets and accordingly the rate of target designations in controlling the fire of subunits, and the level and nature of noise on the radio networks. During practical performance of firing, there are periodic changes in the direction of movement of the tanks, variants and order of exposure of range targets and the range to the targets. All this makes the exercises and firings intense and makes it possible to raise the effectiveness of competition for striking the targets with the first round or salvo.

Here is an example. On a tank firing training exercise held according to the complicated program, low results were displayed by the platoon led by Guards Lieutenant S. Shmit. On subsequent training exercises, the officer analyzed the operations of the commanders and gunners, rated them on mission performance and announced this to his subordinates in an exercise critique. Competition heated up in the platoon for quality in executing individual missions and normative provisions which led to satisfactory results.

Raising quality of fire training in the regiment was promoted by introducing some new formalized documents used in activities, training exercises and combat firings. Thus, together with officers from higher headquarters, Senior Lieutenant Yu. Zhadobin succeeded in attaching to the capabilities of our firing training grounds and introducing into practice a detailed record of the tank firing training exercises. It has allowed the exercise director to assess the actions of each trainee. For example, during the time he executes a fire mission, the trainee firing receives up to five, and during the entire tank firing training exercise, up to 19 ratings. Rated individually is the ability of the trainee within normative periods to detect the target, properly determine its importance and range, give the target designation, prescribe the initial settings for the first round, competently give the command to open fire, hit the target accurately, perform fire adjustment, etc. These ratings, of course, are later merged into a total. But each affects the final result. Therefore, there is a natural campaign between the warriors for high quality in performing each element of the operations.

Or take the graph for analysis of the quality of performance of combat firings that was developed by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Koretskiy, a large unit staff officer, and introduced into the practice of training by Guards Senior Lieutenants A. Boykov and S. Miskiv. The document, simple in form, makes it possible in the field to expeditiously take into account, for example, the number of hits of shells on a range target. Say, for example, that three crews are firing and all hit the targets. But one with three, the other with two and the third with one round. What are the specific causes of such a difference? In summing up the results of the firing and

exchanging experience, this is easy to find out, after evaluating the position of those firing in the competition at the same time too.

Personnel fire training to a decisive extent is determined by the skill of the commanders themselves and by the level of their instructional skills and knowledge. We strive to see that the firing skill of the officers serves as a model for the personnel. I will cite this fact. It has become a rule with us: before starting the execution of the next firing exercise, each officer executes it himself, thoroughly studies before this the theoretical grounds of this exercise and takes the examination. I think there is no need to explain how important this is. After this work, almost completely excluded are cases of a mechanical approach by officers both to execution of fire missions personally and to organization of subordinate training.

Take this example. Until just recently, only a few platoon leaders could prepare weapons for combat to perfection. This work, in particular, was performed by Guards Senior Lieutenants A. Boykov and S. Miskiv. Now 70 percent of the officers can successfully handle it.

There are many such cases. The comprehensive approach to training masters of fire is yielding good results. This is confirmed too by the indicators of summer combat training. Many officers are successfully meeting their socialist pledges. On a tactical exercise for some subunits with combat firing, the overwhelming majority of range targets were hit by the first rounds and salvos. The overwhelming, but not all. Consequently, we still have to work on that.

Shortcomings in Organization Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Alyab'yev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Why Are Shortcomings Being Repeated"]

[Text] In a certain tank regiment, summer training has started in an unorganized manner and the effectiveness of competition is low.

Personnel in the tank regiment in question did a lot of work to be well prepared for summer combat training. In particular, much has been done in terms of improving the base of training materials and equipment. One could say that the tankers now have everything to successfully campaign for a high final result in the competition with other units in the large unit. But how are they using the available capabilities?

At division headquarters, the view on that score is unanimous: the first weeks of summer training could have been more fruitful if the proper lessons had been learned in the regiment from the mistakes made in the winter. It is difficult to disagree with this. In the winter training period, the tankers did not meet their pledges. And in many indicators, they have now fallen behind their rivals in the competition.

I had occasion to be in the regiment in the concluding stage of winter training. Much blame was placed on Captain B. Krivenkov. His company received the lowest

rating in the unit for fire training. The deputy commander for political affairs, I recall, had this to say: "Krivenkov let us down. If his subordinates had fired better, the regiment would have met its pledges...."

I had occasion to hear something similar from the unit staff officers too. But was the cause really just in this company? The inspectors could not ignore the achievements of a large collective and judge the results of meeting pledges by regimental personnel just by the indicators of one company. As noted in the inspection report, poor results were displayed by the subunits commanded by Senior Lieutenants V. Magorin and V. Vasil'yev, Lieutenant Colonel A. Semen'ko and certain others.

Well after all, it is not a question of to what extent the result of a particular company affected the overall rating for the regiment. It is important to clear up another question: why was this subunit lagging?

This is how it was with Captain Krivenkov's company. The commission required the firing to be conducted under the complex conditions provided for by the course of firings. But during daily training here, indulgences and simplifications were often tolerated. And this had its effect on the inspection. The people who did not have the required skills became flustered and many range targets remained untouched. The fact that the mobilizing force of competition was poorly used in the company for raising personnel skills also had its effect. Results were not regularly summed up. In the process, attention was not paid to the conditions under which high scores were obtained and what was behind them.

How deeply were the reasons for the failures analyzed in the regiment, what conclusions were drawn, and what steps were taken to prevent a repetition of this? There is a document in which the results of combat training and the results of competition for the winter training period are summed up. It would seem that the attention in it ought to have been focused on the main directions of the work to eliminate the shortcomings revealed during the inspection. But this too is not evident. There is not even a mention of regimental personnel not meeting their socialist pledges. But after all, perhaps the work in the unit on preparing for the summer training period and raising the effectiveness of competition ought to have been started precisely with reflection on this. But it has turned out that some officers even now do not know the true reasons for the shortcomings turned up in the inspection. That is why the version that one company is to blame for all the failures is still going around the regiment.

Meanwhile, everything is far more complex. Deficiencies in the methodological training of some exercise directors are having an effect on the quality and effectiveness of summer combat training. Much has to be done by the regimental staff and party organization too in terms of raising the exactingness of officers in assessing the results of their own work and that of their subordinates. This is indicated in particular by the lack of correspondence between the ratings made by regimental officers in accounts of supervised exercises and the ratings made by the commission inspecting the readiness of the subunits. To illustrate this, Captain Krivenkov's company continually received high ratings on the supervised exercises conducted by regimental officers. But the results were far lower in the inspection. This fact speaks for itself.

Deficiencies in organization of competition are also being repeated. Many warriors, including the officers, with whom I talked, could not give an exhaustive answer relative to the goals planned in the competition for the summer training period.

"We are in no hurry to make pledges," the regimental commander explained the situation. "Everything has to be properly weighed...."

This position is not quite clear. After all, competition is an integral part of the entire process of combat and political training. This means that well before the start of summer training, the goals for which the personnel would be striving ought to have been set with exhaustive clarity. And the collective pledges should be based on personal pledges. This is a major prerequisite for the warriors to consider taking part in competition a vital matter and to have a feeling of responsibility for meeting the pledges. Moreover, it is important to see not only the specific ultimate goals of competition, but to also clearly know the intermediate aims. In this unit, unfortunately, this aspect is underestimated.

"What are my pledges for the summer training period?" Junior Sergeant V. Lavrent'yev repeated. "I'll be driving and firing...."

That is just about the way Junior Sergeant V. Kolikov, Privates S. Pirov and A. Dzhumagulov and many others answered. And even some officers had difficulty in forming their personal pledges and those of the subunits subordinate to them.

As a matter of fact, the new warriors are not taking part in the competition at all. They have no set training process. Over the course of several days, I was unable to find out what sort of schedule they are following.

"We reorganize on the move," said Sergeant M. Dzhabadov. "When the order is given to take territory, we take it, and when we are told to work at the ration supply dump, we work...."

One cannot but think of the cost to morale of such lack of organization. This is not at all the lesson that people starting out in army service should be getting.

Some of the causes of pledges not being met in the winter training period were organizational discrepancies, including activity disruptions. This is still going on even now.

In the subunit where Captain A. Logashenko is the acting commander, an exercise on tactical training was scheduled. But it was not held because all the officers were in school that day. The personnel were left to themselves. Some other subunits found themselves in the same situation that day.

"There was no coordination in planning officer training," it was said at division headquarters. "We'll have to make up what was missed."

Of course, it is necessary to eliminate deficiencies and make up what was missed. But after all, there is a more reliable way to achieve a high end result. And that is efficient organization of the training process and daily concern for the effectiveness of competition.

Misuse of Training Time Scored

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Major L. Bezzubov: "On the Wrong Field..."]

[Text] Training time is being wasted in a certain tank regiment.

The personnel of a certain tank regiment did not meet their pledges in the winter training period. The proper conclusions were not drawn from this. Lack of coordination in the training process and cases of diverting personnel from planned activities are continuing in the regiment.

The consolidated activity schedule that I reviewed at regimental headquarters indicated the day would be intense. The tankers had to practice a number of problems on defense against weapons of mass destruction and fire, engineer and some other types of combat training.

However, I was unable to find anyone following the schedule either at the training center or in the unit's territory. Where were the tankers? Sergeant S. Suzdal'tsev and Privates I. Bashtanenko and A. Raimbayev, who I found in the barracks of one of the companies of the third battalion explained that there were no activities today because almost the whole battalion was sent to weed sunflowers.

"Yes, that is really so," confirmed Lieutenant Yu. Toiskin. "They were prepared to go out to one field, the training, but ended up on another...."

It turned out that the third battalion was on weeding duty for the second week now. And this battalion is not the only subunit where personnel were pulled away from planned activities on combat training. Warriors from the battalion commanded by Captain I. Gnilorybov were also doing farm work that day, although the schedule called for fire and technical training. Platoon leader Senior Lieutenant V. Beribov showed me a detailed plan-summary of activities that had not been held.

"I was ready yesterday up to late in the evening," the young officer said bitterly, "but now... The platoon made high pledges for the summer training period, but as a matter of fact we have not begun to meet them. And today we're digging holes for posts...."

What is going on? Why at the height of the summer training period is there such an irresponsible attitude toward use of training time in a regiment that the division considers to be lagging?

"Try to understand us correctly," the division deputy commander for rear services said fervently, "if there's any delay with the sunflowers, we could lose the harvest."

Sure, it is important to rid a field of weeds and create prerequisites on time for a good harvest on a subsidiary farm. And it is evident that holes are needed for the posts that Senior Lieutenant Beribov mentioned. But just one thing is unclear: why is all this being done at the expense of training time? After all, the consequences of the lack of organization now observed in the training process are already having

an effect. In striving to make up for what has been missed, the activity leaders are forced in one activity and in one training exercise to give the trainees such a large amount of knowledge that the high quality of their assimilating it does not have to be mentioned.

If you consider that, as I said earlier, the regiment did not meet its socialist pledges in the winter training period, then you can well imagine how difficult it will be for the tankers in autumn when they will have to account for everything achieved in the training year. The commander of the regiment, the officers and the communists have to do some serious thinking about this. And division headquarters has to think about that too.

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NAVAL FORCES

PATROL BOAT COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy: "Their Own Pier"]

[Text] Somehow it got dark unexpectedly, instantaneously. A viscid darkness enmeshed the bay. Nimble boats and clumsy tugs, passenger vessels and a hard-working tanker were moving through its channel which was illuminated by the dim light of the the running lights.

Captain 3d Rank Anatoliy Babenko stood on the flying bridge and thought anxiously: would he, a young commander, be able to pilot the ship through a channel which was so busy and, most important, unfamiliar to him? Prior to this, he served at another base. Now, after the accomplishment of a training mission, he returned from sea to an unknown pier. He could not take a risk and, moreover, there is the instruction: someone senior must be on board in such a situation. Babenko ordered stopping movement. A telegram took off to headquarters.

When the duty officer reported it to the flag officer, the latter smiled:

"Does it mean that Captain 3d Rank Babenko needs a pilot? There's bad luck: I have an urgent matter and the chief of staff is at sea." And, thinking for a while, he decided: "Please take his place on duty--and take the boat. Very likely, Vladimir Yakovlevich, you are just as interested as I am in seeing that this ship is reliably piloted to the pier."

Captain 3d Rank Babenko saw from a distance the boat which was flying rapidly over the waves, and he understood that this was assistance for him, cheered up, and his spirits rose. An officer soon jumped on board the submarine. In the darkness the commander did not discern his face, tossed up his hand, and prepared to report. The hand wavered when he saw his brother, Captain 2d Rank Vladimir Babenko, who had climbed onto the bridge.

"Well, brother, get under way. Oh, and I have command over you now. Steady!"

"You will abuse your authority--I will complain to our father," Anatoliy answered in a joking tone.

"Yes," Vladimir answered. "He asks how things are going with you and complains that you seldom write."

"You'll see for yourself, there is no time."

"Then tell me how the sailing went."

"First, you tell me how your prize firing went."

"We were at sea at the same time you were. But I returned a day earlier and immediately went on duty as unit duty officer. But thus far, no grade for the prize firing. But both torpedoes hit the target."

"There will be a prize, there will also be Caucasian shashlik," Anatoliy said gaily. "And now, as you order, I'll get under way."

The submarine was pulled confidently into the bay.

"Well, you steer the ship well. Why worry headquarters and me?" noted Vladimir as he observed the maneuvering.

"Don't hurry, mooring ahead."

An inconvenient place had been allotted to the ship for mooring, and here Anatoliy had the occasion only to repeat his older brother's commands.

"Dashinglly," he could not restrain his admiration when, literally in minutes, the submarine stood tightly side by side with an adjacent ship.

"Learn to work more clearly with the diesels, don't give too many commands," said Vladimir at parting. "And now, to report to the flag officer."

...They were born and grew up in Baku. There were five of them in the family of an arc welder—three sons and two daughters. The older ones found positions at once: Georgiy and Yuliya became engineers, Oktaviya—a Komsomol worker. Without wavering, Vladimir entered the higher naval school, but Anatoliy did not choose his path at once.

"I'll enter the institute, I'll be an engineer," he said to Vladimir when the latter, after finishing school, took off for his place of service.

But five more years passed, and the brothers met in the fleet. At this time, Vladimir was a captain-lieutenant and executive officer on a submarine. Anatoliy received an assignment as commander of a group.

"Why didn't you enter the institute? Or did you fail?" Vladimir joked, recalling the conversation of long ago. "For you dreamed of becoming an engineer."

"And I am an engineer," Anatoliy answered. "But a military engineer. And here is my diploma."

The evening flew by in conversations. Vladimir told about submarine service openly, without adornment and frankly.

"It will be easier for you," he noted towards the end. "I will be able to help."

However, they seldom met, and soon they parted. Vladimir was sent to courses. He returned and received the submarine. He did much sailing. And after a while, Anatoliy was sent to these same courses. Like a shadow, he followed on his brother's heels. Just as Vladimir, he climbed all the rungs: commander of a group, department, executive officer. With the only difference that in time he proceeded exactly five years later. Just like his older brother, after the courses he was appointed commander of a submarine, but in another unit. And then time passed and their submarines were moored side by side at the same pier.

In assigning an office on shore to Anatoliy, the flag officer said:

"Be alongside your brother. As if in adjacent compartments which are separated by a bulkhead. If one knocks on it, the other is already on the threshold."

That's how it was this time, too. Vladimir turned over his duty officer function and invited Anatoliy:

"Well, now I can tell about the prize firing."

A diagram of the training battle was drawn quickly beneath a pencil. The "enemy" maneuvered for five hours. The submarine pursued him just as long. The order for the attack was to arrive suddenly, and this ignorance exhausted Vladimir Babenko most of all. The tactical and hydrometeorological situation was not in his favor. He was careful not to confuse the target ship with the escort ship.

"Is it really possible to confuse them?" Anatoliy felt a doubt.

"Completely, as the situation is nonstandard." And Vladimir related what once happened with him. "This time, I did not make a mistake. The tables helped. This, my brother, is a complete science," Vladimir got the tables which absorbed the experience of the best commanders--submariners and antisubmariners.

"Well done," Anatoliy was delighted, "did you make them yourself?"

"Do you think that someone gave them to me as a present? I became engaged with them immediately after that ill-fated attack of the escort ship. But no tables will help if you do not knock together a strong ship's combat section."

"But how can you achieve this in a short time?"

"Here's what we'll do. Tomorrow I'll conduct a drill of the section. Come with your own people. To the 'Attack' room. Later--to the submarine."

They met in the morning in the training room. Anatoliy Babenko arrived with his complete ship's section. The drill began. One was immediately struck: the seamen of the brother's section are working as if with a double safety. The commander--the executive officer--was the chief of the radio service.... A closed chain from top to bottom. And the junior Babenko still noted: the people understand each other at once, with the first gesture, no one asks anyone to repeat himself, and only necessary commands are given.

"How did things turn out for you," Anatoliy asked after the drill.

"Here, brother, you can't answer in one word," Vladimir walked up and down the room. "There is work to be done. My wife once said: 'Look at yourself in the mirror, see how your face has become pinched.' And you see, at that time I was preparing for an exercise. Most of all, I was careful of stereotype.. I gamed various versions of operations dozens of times."

On an exercise in the course of which a duel situation was worked out the flag officer, foreseeing the entire complexity of the situation, chose Captain 2d Rank Vladimir Babenko. And the latter justified the confidence. The commander rewarded the bold and skillful commander with inscribed binoculars. The details of this innovational attack are now stored by all submarine commanders in their synopses.

In preparing for the first difficult torpedo firing, Anatoliy asked his older brother:

"Come to the drill of our combat section."

"Are you operating using my method?"

"You'll see."

When the drill was completed, the critique began.

"Much in your commands, Anatoliy, is superficial," the older brother frowned. "Reports from the battle stations are not clear, either. You are losing seconds and minutes. And now, let us talk about preparations for firing."

The conversation lasted for a long time. But not in vain--Vladimir Babenko managed to transmit much from his own experience to his younger brother....

He was with the flag officer when they reported: a submarine under the command of Captain 3d Rank Anatoliy Babenko is entering the bay. Vladimir began to bustle.

"Do you have urgent matters?" the flag officer asked?

"Yes, in general that is correct," Vladimir became embarrassed.

"I understand.... Go."

The flag officer saw how, in leaving his office, Captain 2d Rank Vladimir Babenko ran toward the pier.

Darkness again descended over the bay. Seeing the running lights of the submarine, Vladimir thought uneasily. "Will he moor by himself somehow?"

Alarm did not leave him until the mooring lines fell on the pier.

"Did both torpedoes hit?" Vladimir asked first thing.

"They passed through as they should," Anatoliy answered.

"I am happy for you. And now you are already mooring better."

On the day when the crew commanded by Captain 2d Rank Vladimir Babenko was awarded the Challenge Naval Prize, Captain 3d Rank Anatoliy Babenko stood in the submariners' formation. Later he lifted the heavy silver cup, read the inscription on it, and said:

"Could I win it from you like this in a year?"

"Try," answered Vladimir and, smiling, he added: "And now prepare the Caucasian shahslikh. Do you remember the promise?"

"There will be, dear brother, the shashlikh will be so good that you'll lick your fingers. Come this evening, see for yourself...."

They stood, embracing, on the concrete of their own pier and watched the patches of sunlight race over the dark water. The sea opened up beyond the cape. Their love, their fate, their service.

6367

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NAVAL FORCES

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL: ADMIRAL CHERNAVIN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 81 p 2

[Interview with Admiral V. Chernavin, commander of Red Banner Northern Fleet, on the occasion of Victory Day, by Captain 3d Rank S. Bystrov: "The Valor of Those Who Received the Baton"; date and place not given]

[Text] The Day of Victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War is receding farther and farther into history. But the glorious exploit will not grow dim and its memory in the hearts of new generations is strong and reliable. Glorious combat traditions, loyalty to which is the duty and honor of each Soviet serviceman, were born in the crucible of battles. On the eve of the victory celebration the correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Captain 3d Rank S. Bystrov, appealed to the commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, Hero of the Soviet Union and Admiral V. Chernavin, with the request to tell how the traditions of selflessness, bravery, and skill and boundless devotion to the party and the people which were left by the frontline fighters as a heritage for today's defenders of the motherland are being preserved and multiplied in the fleet.

[Question] Comrade admiral, it is known that the names of famous ships not only remain in history, but are also handed down to new ships. One of the latter examples is the missile cruiser "Kirov."

[Answer] And this is profoundly symbolic. Navy men of all fleets received with enthusiasm the news that the Red Banner which the famous gun cruiser "Kirov" was awarded for services in the struggle with the fascist aggressors had been raised on the missile cruiser "Kirov." To sail under this flag is a great honor and lofty confidence. It should be justified. And the responsibility for this lies not only with the crew of the cruiser--on our entire Northern Fleet. Therefore, the raising of the Red Banner on the "Kirov" is also a very important event for me personally.

[Question] You must have experienced this back in your commander years when the submarine which you commanded was awarded the flag of one of the famous submarines of the wartime Northern Fleet.

[Answer] Yes. And it is especially interesting that that famous submarine K-21 will continue to serve the fleet for a long time. During the war, it was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 2d Rank N. Lunin. Seventeen victories were to the credit of the K-21, including the attack, in a difficult situation, on the fascist battleship "Tirpitz" which frustrated the plan of operations of the enemy squadron of surface ships. In the postwar years, the K-21 continued to sail and then was re-equipped as a training station, that is, it served the fleet continuously and with great value.

One day, I walked along the pier to which the K-21 was moored. I read the bronze plaque on the conning tower which testifies to the ship's services and talked things over with the submariners. They unanimously supported turning their ship, which had served its time, into a memorial. An initiative group for restoring the K-21 was created. It appealed for assistance to engineers, workers, construction personnel, and seamen. And thousands of people made the decision to work on restoring the ship gratis. It will be placed in a most prominent place in the North Sea. In a certain sense, the K-21 will again return to the combat formation: many generations of navy men, inspired by the exploits of the wartime fighters, will walk its decks.

[Question] Unfortunately, the successor to the flag of the K-21 is not as well known. And you see, it was one of the first nuclear submarines and it has many services to the fleet to its credit.

[Answer] For the navy man, probably, there are no dearer recollections than of the ships on which he served or which he commanded. Therefore, I fear being unobjective. But up to now, our nuclear-powered ship seems to be to be exemplary in all respects. Together with the crew, I had to receive from the yard a ship which was fundamentally different from those diesel submarines with which the Soviet submariners were familiar. And the commander in chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov, in making the decision to transfer the flag of the K-21 to our nuclear-powered ship saw, I presume, the deep symbolic meaning in the fact that from the first miles under the flag made famous by the wartime fighters our crew keenly felt its responsibility to the history of the fleet, its present and future.

[Question] Facts show that the crew coped successfully with that mission. The nuclear-powered ship carried the flag of the K-21 in a worthy manner. It is sufficient to recall, most likely, that you, its first commander, the executive officer, and the assistant subsequently became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

[Answer] The first to be awarded this lofty title was the former executive officer, L. Stolyarov who, in 1966, participated as commander of the ship in the famous round-the-world cruise of nuclear submarines. Then the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to A. Pavlov, a former executive officer from this submarine who already was a captain of a ship. But then, two decades ago, we did not think of high awards but, with the recklessness of youth, giving all our strength to the service, we mastered the new equipment.

To some degree the ship was lucky--we opened many ways to the new and unknown. Before the submarine "Leninskiy Komsomol" accomplished its historic cruise beneath the ice of the North Pole, our ship had worked out the procedure for sailing under the ice, surfacing in a water opening.

We did not think of glory, we were carried away by trail blazing. It required of the seamen purposefulness, bravery, and boundless devotion to the cause. As always, the tone was set by the officers and, first of all, the communists. Basically, the executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant A. Pavlov, did not leave the crew at all. The ship's party organization worked actively and with initiative, creating a high combat spirit among the submariners. The seamen were ready to make any sacrifice for the sake of their ship and to defend its honor, whatever it may concern.

[Question] Selflessness, evidently, can be called the professional quality of the navy man. The combat operations of the Northern Fleet men are a brilliant example of this. For almost every attack from beneath the water was accomplished under conditions extremely risky for the submariners.

[Answer] Unquestionably, there can be no victory without selflessness. And this traditional quality of the Soviet serviceman is transmitted from generation to generation. Recently, the commander of the large antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ship "Zhguchiy," Captain 2d Rank A. Kibkalo, reported to me about the results of a long, many-months cruise. The crew and commander had to endure very heavy physical and psychological loads, but the ship accomplished the assigned missions successfully. As duty requires, so do traditions.

The three and a half years of my command of a nuclear-powered ship occurred at the time when the country's nuclear submarine fleet had just been created. The nuclear powered ships were cloaked in the haze of uncertainty, and admiration at that time... in apprehensions. But how the best officers strived to serve on them!

Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant V. Zarembovskiy was assigned to us from a diesel submarine as the commander of the engineering department. However, the unit's medical board did not pass him because of a minor defect. He requested permission to go to a fleet board--the same result. Then Zarembovskiy flew to the medical board in Moscow. "Well, and if they operate on me?" the engineering officer asked the medics. "Then, perhaps, you will be fit," they answered him. A few days later I received a telegram: "I am fit. Am travelling. Zarembovskiy." Now Vladislav Leonidovich Zarembovskiy is an Engineer-Rear Admiral. To a great extent thanks to the selfless labor of this person under whose administration was virtually the entire ship, the crew achieved a high level of sailing reliability and the successful accomplishment of the most difficult missions.

That in our time, too, consciousness of military duty and noble selflessness summon the navy men to an exploit is shown convincingly by the following fact: the detachment of Northern Fleet men who are Heroes of the Soviet Union and who earned this title in days of peace numbers dozens of men.

[Question] In your office, an entire shelf is allotted to historical and memoir literature of the fleet.

[Answer] When I was a young officer, we considered it impermissible to have poor knowledge of the biographies of submarine commanders, prominent military leaders, and participants in the war. Of course, we had in mind the combat aspect of their biographies. You see, this is a kind of primary source of combat experience. You interpret it in a new manner with each new post. Therefore, even now I always have memoirs and historical literature close at hand.

The experience of the wartime fighters requires profound study. We indoctrinate commanders and political officers of ships in this spirit, and they must teach their subordinates to look at the fleet's combat chronical in this manner. The military council, commanders, political organs and staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the fleet, in accomplishing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, are striving in every possible way to raise the effectiveness of the seamen's indoctrination in a spirit of loyalty to heroic traditions. On our ships, for example, the movement of the seamen for the right to be called the followers of the best specialists of the war years received the widest dissemination. Meetings with the participants in battles are conducted regularly, patron ties are being strengthened, and ceremonies born already in the postwar years, including rendering honors to heroes at the coordinates of combat glory, are strictly observed.

[Question] Comrade admiral, you served in the Northern Fleet for many years. What especially remains in your memory from past years?

[Answer] Actually, all my officer service--I had the occasion to spend 30 years, from commander of the torpedo department of a diesel submarine to my present post, in the Northern Fleet. During this time our youngest fleet in the country, which participated actively in the rout of the enemy at sea during the entire war, was transformed into a powerful ocean-going fleet in the full meaning of the word and was equipped with modern ships. And in the years of peace service in the North and long cruises require of people bravery, skill, and selflessness. The sons and grandsons of the war heroes are valiantly carrying the baton of the combat glory of their fathers and grandfathers. The Northern Fleet men clearly recognize the complexity of the contemporary international situation and the necessity for a further rise in vigilance and combat readiness. In the single formation of the Soviet Armed Forces they are accomplishing their duty to the fatherland with honor.

Each time that I approach the map of the operational situation and see the tremendous spatial scope of the combat training activity of the Northern Fleet's forces, I am sorry that the wartime Northern Fleet men who gave their lives for the motherland cannot see this. That which they attained in battles--the fatherland's freedom, peace for the communist future which is being built, and the new stage of creation which was outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress--is in firm, skillful, and reliable hands today.

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CSO: 1801/279

NAVAL FORCES

ANNOUNCEMENT FOR LOMONOSOV NAVAL SCHOOL

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 81 p 4

[Article: "Lomonosov Naval School Announces Enrollment for First Course in 1981"]

[Text] The school trains specialists with a secondary special education for work in command duties on naval support vessels.

Enrollment is accomplished on the basis of a secondary education in specialties of officer of the deck-technician, engineer-technician, electrician-technician, and radio technician.

Period of instruction is three years four months.

The school accepts youths 17 years of age and older in state of health fit for work in the Navy.

Persons are enrolled without competition who have a work record of at least two years of practical work or have been released to the reserve from active military service upon receiving favorable grades on the entry examinations.

Officer candidates receive full state support. Those who desire to enter the school submit an application addressed to the school superintendent indicating the specialty selected. Applications are accepted up to 5 August.

The following are appended to the application: a detailed autobiography, references from place of work or study, Komsomol or party references (for members of the Komsomol and the CPSU), a document concerning education in the original, extract from the work book (for those who have a work record), four photos 3x4 centimeters in size (without headgear), medical certificate for those entering secondary special educational institutions (form 286) indicating suitability for naval service, certificate from place of work and parents' place of residence.

Upon arrival at the school, entrants personally present birth certificate or passport, military service record or registered certificate.

Entrance examinations are conducted from 1 through 10 August in Russian language and literature (composition) and in mathematics (oral).

Those who complete the school are awarded an all-union-type diploma attesting to a secondary technical education.

School address: 188510, Leningrad-Lomonosov, ulitsa Krasnogo Flota, d. 18/48.
Entrance commission.

NAVAL FORCES

SUBMARINE DEFENSIVE SONAR TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Poshivaylov and Capt 3d Rank V. Mel'nikov: "How Many Years for the Standard?"]

[Text] The submariners accomplished a combat exercise. In the course of it, they had to set out means for sonar countermeasures and employ combined signal charges. In general, the seamen coped with these missions. In this regard, they spent 1.5 times less time than is allotted by the appropriate standard. However, officer Yu. Nichik, who directed the training, did not hide his dissatisfaction with the work of his subordinates. And actually, although they succeeded in exceeding the standard, the men worked without special strain and committed mistakes for the correction of which it was necessary to expend additional seconds.

Nichik then gave the seamen a low grade. And he corrected it to excellent only the next time, when he was convinced that the submariners, in accomplishing a training mission, are utilizing all their capabilities and operating with the maximum output of strength.

It cannot be denied that such exactingness by the officer causes approval. It stimulates people not to stop with what has been attained and to raise their ability persistently. But in paying homage to the leading commander, one automatically falls to thinking about something else: and what kind of standard is this if it can be exceeded with ease, even working half-heartedly?

It turns out that the standard was established several years ago. During this time the designs of the technical means which are used in its accomplishment changed as did the organization of their employment. In general, much changed, but through someone's oversight the standard remained unchanged.

In our view, an important problem stands behind this fact. The Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR which were approved by the 26th CPSU Congress tell of the necessity to consider more completely the factor of time, to accomplish tasks in compressed times, and to intensify the mobilizing role of technically substantiated standards. Of course, the party document is speaking about tasks connected with the development of the national economy. But you see, all these questions are also extremely urgent for us, military people.

In contemporary battle, other conditions being equal, the winner is the one who is able to preempt the enemy and whose actions are clearer and better coordinated. Speed, clarity, and coordination are attained first of all through the precise and timely execution of commands, operations, and maneuvers by each man, section, and crew. In other words, the men's actions must be strictly regulated for the effective accomplishment of the assigned missions. The combat standards are also called upon to accomplish this function. And it is not by chance that they are frequently called the "criteria of quality."

But here, in our opinion, it is necessary to note that they can be "criteria of quality" only if they have been developed on a strictly scientific basis and if the capabilities of equipment and man's capabilities and his ability to acquire certain qualities under the influence of systematic and purposeful drills are considered. And, perhaps, what is especially important, if they meet today's requirements for the naval forces' combat readiness.

The overwhelming majority of the standards and evaluating indices by which we are guided in organizing training and competition on the ships and in the units are just of this type. However, although it happens very rarely, unfortunately we still encounter some which are somewhat outside the general clear system of criteria for combat ability.

Why does this occur? There are various reasons. Let us say that in the case of that same "outdated" standard of the submariners, as it turned out, the entire fault was a bureaucratic approach to the matter. The solidity of the standard was important primarily for the sonarmen and the signalmen, and the technical equipment which is used in its accomplishment is serviced by the specialists of the engineering departments who are completely satisfied by the established time framework. As a result, for a long time the corresponding higher fleet services could not come to an understanding as to what the standard should be.

At times, such dogmatism in the approach to combat standards is also encountered. A ship goes into operation--standards for the maintenance and use of its weapons and equipment are worked out and the standards for evaluating the ability of the specialists are approved. And it happens that for years they are looked upon as something unshakable: the equipment, they say, remains the same on the ship, so why adjust them?

Is this correct? Hardly. For experience in operating equipment is accumulated with the years. What was an achievement when it was only being mastered becomes a usual thing with time.

The requirements for the combat readiness of ships and units are constantly growing. Obviously, this growth should also find reflection in the combat standards. It is necessary that they orient people clearly and summon them for an assault on the heights of military skill.

At times, we speak much about how important it is to accomplish the standards clearly and to struggle to exceed them in the course of training and competition. But do we always think about how to see that the authority of the standards is high in the eyes of the men and that their mobilizing role is always high under any conditions?

But you see, this is also very important. It is a matter which is directly connected with a further rise in combat readiness. And its success, in our view, depends on everyone--on the competent authorities who have been charged with working out and approving the standards and, if required, applying the necessary corrections to them. And on commanders at all echelons, staffs, and political organs. And on those who, in fact, must accomplish the standards.

The following fact is recalled. An innovation was introduced on one of the ships on the initiative of Captain-Lieutenant A. Manzhos, Senior Lieutenant A. Vas'ko, and Lieutenant V. Bondarenko--to improve the organization of the work of one of the battle stations. This permitted reducing by more than half the time established for the reception, processing, and output of reports on the aerial situation. But the seamen were not satisfied by this alone. The innovation contributed to the appearance of other innovations, in particular, in the organization of the training process and in its intensification. The crew of the battle station began to drill now for goals with parameters more complex than formerly, and special situations began to sound on the drills more often concerning "damage" to the materiel, concerning the "enemy's" employment of toxic agents, and so forth. In general, the officers seemingly introduced a unique correction to the existing standard, intentionally complicating the conditions for its accomplishment. Corrections were also introduced in the summing up of the results of competition by tasks and standards.

Of course, the significance of such corrections is higher when they operate not only within the framework of some one crew. Innovations which are introduced on one or another ship must be introduced without fail on all the other ships of the same type. Staff officers and those of the corresponding services must be concerned that the content of the standards is also constantly enriched on the basis of advanced organization of the training process and the best organization of military labor.

One can often hear: the standard is a law. Yes, this is so. Each operation on equipment should be accomplished in a strictly established time and in strict conformance with the requirements of the instruction. But really, is a creative approach excluded here?

Of course, such "creativity" as that with which the subordinates of Warrant Officer [michman] L. Yarmolyuk were occupied at one time, for example, is unsuitable anywhere. They achieved record indices in accomplishing the standards by simplifying some mandatory operations in servicing the equipment. There is only harm from this.

Another matter is true creativity, the basis of which is not the "pursuit of a record," but concern for combat readiness. Typical in this plane is the attitude of the commander of an excellent missile battery, Senior Lieutenant A. Mikhal'chenko, to the standards. This officer devotes much attention to seeing that his subordinates know all the standards thoroughly and struggle to exceed them actively, in an atmosphere of competition. At the same time, with the assistance of senior comrades and flag specialists he conducts a persistent search for reserves which are "concealed" in the equipment and for possibilities to expand known technical norms. On exercises and drills, the officer looks for the most effective procedures for using weapons and strives to take from them everything which is contained in them.

And you see, more is contained in equipment and weapons than the men know about them and, at times, even more than their creators intended. This is why the commander needs a research approach.

In our view, the necessity for a research approach to combat standards also follows from this. The thoughtful commander will not wait until certain instructions "come down" to him from above. He, himself, will ascertain to what extent one or another standard meets today's requirements and the missions facing the crew and, if necessary, will pose the question of correcting obsolete norms or, himself, within the limits of his competence, will find the possibility to bring them into conformance with these requirements.

Today, one more important question is being placed on the agenda. The complication of the tasks which ships and units must accomplish leads to where the necessity to work out new standards appears. In which regard, these are standards which, if it can be expressed this way, are of a different generation. It is one thing, let us say, to regulate the time in which a serviceman puts on a gas mask. It is a very simple operation in which everything depends only on the state of training of the serviceman himself. It is much more difficult to work out criteria to evaluate, for example, the time to classify a contact with a submarine. Clearly, such a standard cannot be the same for ships of different classes and with different technical capabilities. In addition, prior to defining it, it is necessary to calculate with scrupulous precision the effect which the "enemy" will exert on the classification of the contact using means of deception, sonar counteraction, and so forth.

In general, such a standard is made up of a great number of components which are rather difficult to consider and calculate. But nevertheless, it must be done regardless of how difficult it is. Otherwise, there is no deliverance from superficiality of evaluations of combat ability. And this is intolerable.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress direct us toward increasing the intensification of labor, evaluating the results of work deeply and exactly, and approaching them with a strict party yardstick. Combat standards which are operating effectively for combat readiness, are clearly regulated, and are scientifically substantiated should be loyal assistants in the accomplishment of this task for commanders, staffs, and for all organizers of training and competition.

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CSO: 1801/279

NAVAL FORCES

CRUISE TRAINING ON THE 'ZHGUCHIY'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 May 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Kibkalo, commander of large ASW ship "Zhguchiy": "The Rhythm of Activity"]

[Text] In studying and comprehending the materials of the 26th Party Congress, each of us is striving to draw practical conclusions for his work. The summary report of the CPSU Central Committee which was given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed the necessity to develop in Soviet people activity, initiative, efficiency, and the aspiration for great goals. This requirement also pertains to military personnel. A rise in the service activity of the men is the most important task of the officers and the party organization. I should like to tell of how we accomplished this task on the ship during a long cruise of many months.

It was at the beginning of the cruise. The ocean suddenly darkened after a long calm. Low storm clouds lay heavy from above, bursting open with rain, and below the sea foamed and rocked harshly. The barograph steadily drew a graph of falling pressure which, by itself, always causes concern. A storm hampers navigation and sometimes causes the breakdown of equipment. But, as the commander of the ship, I was concerned about its possible influence on the working tone of the crew. Seasickness and increased physical and psychological loads cause rapid weariness and fatigue. The activity of even energetic, strong people is weakened in a storm. And this is especially impermissible when elements of psychological indifference appear in the attitude and work of individual officers and warrant officers [michman]. For of all the reserves which are taken on a long cruise, the only one which no one will replenish for us and for which we cannot submit a requisition to the support vessels is courage, a combat attitude. We have this entire reserve and only we--primarily the experienced seamen--officers and warrant officers can supply it for the crew. And it is needed incessantly--on a level with bread, fuel, and water.

Without counting on good weather, we began to refuel from a tanker. The refueling was protracted. The executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant A. Machulin committed an oversight which was hardly to be expected of him.

I sat in my chair on the bridge and in no way could I get the officers' conference which had taken place out of my head. It was necessary to have a strict talk with them.

Senior Lieutenant K. Studenikov was late in going on watch. The officer of the watch, G. Lavrov, proved not to be abreast of what is occurring on the ship. The mess officer of the officers mess, Lieutenant V. Zarubin, neglected matters in the wardroom and it was necessary to reelect one at once.

It occurred to me that for the present these officers are not properly attuned to a long cruise. But you see, the sea must be desired for all of us. We selected service in the fleet ourselves as a calling, as a profession. And on departing on a cruise, a navy man should feel an inspired enthusiasm although it is known ahead of time that several months on the ocean is not a diversion but the most difficult and selfless work that there is.

The parting talk with Captain-Lieutenant S. Brusnitsyn, who had achieved a transfer from ship to shore, was automatically recalled. I am not disposed to romance, he said; I have done my sailing. According to my notions, he had gone the distance like the sportsman who forgot, yielding to weakness, what the happiness of the struggle and the joy of victory mean in his life.

The service of a ship's officer is a distance for the strong. It requires an especially deep understanding of the importance of the matter entrusted to you, consciousness of military duty, and an active life's position. For nothing so lifts the personality as an active life's position and a conscientious attitude toward public duty. The party teaches us to regard one's labor with great energy and creative interest and to see its role and place in the general matter of creating a communist future. In this, the truth of a person's active position is checked primarily where the loads are especially great, the situation complicated, and the responsibility high.

For navy men, these are the conditions of a long cruise. It is namely in them that each crew member experiences the maximum of the tests, the successful overcoming of which becomes the indicator of the serviceman's political, professional, and moral maturity.

However, it would be incorrect to think that this activity is manifested in all by itself, the more so under unordinary conditions. There is a need for purposeful indoctrinational work which should be conducted continuously and systematically and is distinguished by a variety of forms and methods, often dynamic and effective.

Soon after departure for sea, I decided to see how the ship's officers had settled down. Some of them had to make room and give up their cabins to representatives of the cruise staff. I dropped into one of the rooms. To tell the truth, the cabin was not very comfortable by itself. But you see, even at the front people contrived to make dugouts both comfortable and, in their own way, cosy. And here--the imprint of indifference all around.

It was necessary to remind the officers that this is their home for several months. They will rest here and they should be drawn here after watch. And until they attain the sense of masters, there is no enthusiasm or initiative.

It became uncomfortable for the young officers.

"Comrade commander," Senior Lieutenant A. Konoplev stepped forward, "excuse us, we became twisted at first. Everything will be in order."

It would appear that the people were compelled. But they began to do things, were carried away, and both enthusiasm and cheerfulness appeared. They began to look in here from other cabins. A private competition arose. And in order to make it more lively and public, we decided to conduct a cabin contest. And the cabin of Senior Lieutenant A. Konoplev was named one of the best. By the way, this officer, just as the majority of his comrades, proved to be very sensitive to just such directing impulses: after his election as mess officer of the officer's mess, the wardroom changed unrecognizably, and Konoplev was adjudged the best watch officer of the ship repeatedly.

It is extremely important to provide the necessary impetus in time on a cruise. A tiny spark is capable of causing a brilliant fire and the favorable reaction of people under certain conditions. But, unfortunately, not in all. It happens that to stimulate a creative attitude it is necessary to conduct long work with a person, destroying his false impression of the degree of his own activity.

By the end of the first stage of the cruise, despite the apparent well-being, we were put on our guard more and more by the situation in the navigation department which is commanded by perhaps one of the most experienced officers, Captain-Lieutenant L. Mel'nik. The external cause of this, strangely, was the very calm behavior of the department commander himself. However, the very first serious check showed that in devoting attention directly to navigation, Mel'nik allowed other matters in the department, including the indoctrination of his subordinates, to drift. This was passivity due to self-confidence, due to his excessive faith in his authority and infallibility. It is typical that the officer did not take critical remarks close to his heart from the very first, either.

No, exhortation and appeal seemed indispensable here, just as with the lieutenants. Energetic shock was required to stimulate this officer to work actively and with maximum return. The state of affairs in BCH [department]-1 was thoroughly checked and analyzed, after which the report of communist Captain-Lieutenant Mel'nik was heard at the party bureau.

The conclusiveness of the facts and the sharp criticism of the comrades did their part. The officer gave his word to change his attitude toward service and toward the indoctrination of subordinates and, with his experience and competence, this did not present special difficulty.

And quite a different approach toward himself was required by the executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant A. Machulin, who replaced the experienced and energetic Captain 3d Rank V. Dobroskochenko who loved his work. Once, Machulin was very awkward. He did not control matters, they controlled him. At first it was thought that the officer was lazy. No, he was occupied with something all the time, he tried to eliminate rebukes, and he greatly suffered through his failures, but a certain lack of self-collection and internal sluggishness did not permit him to really feel comfortable in his post.

If something could also help here, it was talks face to face and prudent prompting which helps a person to orient all his inner strengths correctly and to direct them toward the accomplishment of the main tasks.

One day, I invited the executive officer to my cabin. We had a long talk. We discussed the fact that the executive officer is a future commander. But in order for him to become one simple desire and simple expedition are not enough. It is necessary to regard matters creatively, to rise above trivial details, to be more strictly demanding toward oneself. One should be carried away, catch fire. The executive officer heeded this advice and began to work with greater initiative on the cruise.

Yes, the true activity of people is manifested equally--in the striving to do as much as possible, in agitation, by sincere suffering for the common cause. But the ways for its inculcation and stimulation are different, and at times unique. Sometimes, it is sufficient to appear before the crew appealingly for the seamen to follow the commanders through fire and water without looking around. And at times, in order to "lead one person to the meridian" the persistent labor and long search of many people are needed.

For the commander on a cruise or in battle, there is nothing more important than faith in the might of his weapons, the high ability of people, and inflexible spiritual steadfastness. Here, the main thing is that the generator of activity exists in the crew and that a strong, restless, and energetic party nucleus of the collective which does not submit to overloads or fatigue constantly operates and sets the tone and mood.

And if, at the start of the cruise, only the party bureau was such a nucleus for us, soon, as is befitting on a ship, the entire party organization and the entire officer collective become one. Officer-communists having many cruises behind them were examples of active participation in everything which concerned the combat readiness of the ship and the successful accomplishment of assigned missions. And you see, the personal example of the communist and officer is a tested means for indoctrinational influence on people.

The crew acquired much experience on the long cruise. But if we stop with what has been attained, rest on our laurels, and become complacent, the successes which have been won can be lost easily and quickly. We understand this well and are striving to devote more attention to problems which have not been completely solved. Not everything is ideal in our organization of ship's service and much must be done for the further strengthening of military discipline and the mastery of equipment. And a rise in the seamen's service activity in every way will serve the successful accomplishment of these tasks.

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CSO: 1801/279

NAVAL FORCES

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN BLACK SEA AVIATION UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev: "And He Goes Scot-Free"]

[Text] In his letter to the editors, Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) V. Men'shikov asserted that, on the whole, he served fairly well, tried, struggled against shortcomings, but was unexpectedly released to the reserve. "Is this really fair?" he asks, admitting only his only mistake--one day he appeared in the subunit in a drunken condition.

"On that day, really, I drank just a little," said Men'shikov when we met. "And before that, there were no complaints about me. Anyone will confirm this."

But, alas, no one confirmed this protestation. Neither his fellow-servicemen nor the personnel of the military commandant's office with whom he met against his will. True, there is an enthusiastic recommendation in Men'shikov's personal file. This document was prepared in one of the aviation units of the Black Sea Fleet where Men'shikov served earlier. The recommendation was approved by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ponomarev. In it, among Men'shikov's other qualities it was also noted that this officer has "sound family relations." The recommendation was written, we note, soon after Men'shikov, drinking heavily, squabbled with his former wife, kicked up a row, and was made answerable to the party for unworthy behavior. Of course, the commander who approved the document could not fail to know about this. But he did not have enough devotion to principle to call things by their names. He gave Men'shikov a favorable recommendation.

From his first days of work at his new location, Senior Lieutenant Men'shikov in no way presented himself in a good light. The deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Captain 3d Rank N. Kutovoy, speaks of him as follows:

"Men'shikov caused us a lot of trouble. He displayed indiscipline and used alcohol. When he received his quarters, he wrote in his wife's parents in the documents unwarrantedly. He received party punishment for his attempt to deceive. He 'forgot' to return to his fellow servicemen money which he had borrowed. He once brought wine into the subunit and drank it with his subordinates. The result was proper: Men'shikov was deprived of his party card and released to the reserve from the Armed Forces."

"And all the same, they were excessively strict with me!" Men'shikov now stands his ground. "If they had rebuffed me in time or prompted me...."

Well, you see, they rebuffed, prompted, and warned. And many times. But Men'shikov did not draw conclusions and became arrogant, rejecting any rebukes sent his way.

In trying to shift the conversation to another channel, Men'shikov willingly speaks of all kinds of abuses which allegedly are occurring in the unit where he served. As a check showed, the majority of his assertions are unsubstantiated and dictated by resentment. But he is absolutely correct in one of them--the company commander, Captain 3d Rank N. Anoshechkin, is not distinguished by personal example either in his behavior or in his attitude toward service.

Men'shikov knew all this earlier, but was silent. Although, as an officer-communist, he could and should have called the attention, let us say, of the party organization to this. But when the question of releasing Men'shikov to the reserve was decided, he recalled all the digressions of the company commander from the requirements of the regulations during their joint service. Strange logic, to put it mildly.

"And what is strange here?" Men'shikov is puzzled. "While we served together, I did not want to wash dirty linen in public. But now I have nothing to lose."

Let us now return to Captain 3d Rank Anoshechkin. In recent years, he has received about 20 disciplinary and five party punishments for violation of military discipline and poor indoctrinational work with subordinates.

A natural question arises: is it really possible that no one in the high organs knew of the defects in the commander's work style and of his unworthy behavior and that the matter was limited only to the imposition of punishment, as they say, at the battalion level?

Nothing of the kind. Last year, the fleet newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA [Combat Watch] published a well-reasoned criticism directed against officer Anoshechkin. A reply to the critical article was published which stated that "the command of the unit where officer N. Anoshechkin serves was shown the lack of principle in evaluating the officer's behavior and the decision to transfer him to another post was adopted. However, this decision just remained on paper."

The following fact causes bewilderment, too. In accordance with the results of the last training year, the company commanded by officer Anoshechkin was declared excellent. But, you see, there were many coarse delinquencies recorded in the documents here. The political officer, Captain 3d Rank A. Omel'chenko, states that the party organization raised this question many times but the unit commander, he says, stood his ground firmly--to consider the company excellent and its undisciplined commander a worthy educator. After all this, is it worth being surprised that they now speak of Anoshechkin as a person who goes scot-free?

Here we must recall the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev which he stated at the November (1979) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "The majority of our cadres are undoubtedly party people who know their business and are able to work and accomplish the assigned tasks. But others are also encountered. However much you speak with them, however much you appeal to their conscience and their sense of duty and responsibility--nothing helps. And here we must operate more resolutely, employ other measures, and replace those who do not cope with the entrusted affair...."

NAVAL FORCES

SONAR TRAINING ON THE 'KOMSOMOLETS KAZAKHSTANA'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "The Submariners Attack"]

[Text] The "enemy," creating an antisubmarine barrier in a narrow passage, seemingly shut the passage very firmly, preventing the submariners from deploying to accomplish the mission.

"Quite a trap," the executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant S. Vedrov, sadly thought. "It will be difficult to break through here."

He began to serve on this submarine, which bears the name "Komsomolets Kazakhstana," comparatively recently. An hereditary submariner, he was assigned here from another crew with a promotion. However, here he already participated in prize competitions. Then the "Komsomolets Kazakhstana" skillfully attacked a detachment of surface ships. Fresh in the memory of the executive officer were difficult attacks--both in the classroom and at sea, where the crew improved combat skill strenuously. A training battle in a duel situation was especially recalled. Success depended on who reaches the assigned area more precisely, detects the "enemy" earlier, and preempts him in launching a strike. In the difficult single combat, at that time success accompanied the "Komsomolets Kazakhstana."

This success had to be consolidated. The commander of the submarine constantly drilled the ship's combat section. He devoted special attention to seeing that special training was conducted in combination with tactical training. And the executive officer, keenly catching the course of the commander's thought, planned training appropriately. The tactical aspect was stressed on lessons and drills, a difficult combat background was created, and reserve variations were envisioned in case people or equipment go out of action. Captain-Lieutenant Vedrov saw to it that the sonarmen did not simply report on their observations, but also learned how to take the bearing to each object of a group target and how to interpret one or another disposition and regrouping of antusubmarine forces tactically.

The seamen, petty officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers were directed toward obtaining permission to execute the duties a step higher than the post occupied. At the same time, searches were conducted for a reserve of secrecy, a reduction in the noise threshold of the ship's mechanisms, and the use of the sea's hydrology with maximum tactical advantage. The commander and the executive officer

trained the watch officers to analyze the reports of the sonarmen comprehensively and to listen to the opinion of the scouts of the depths attentively. In summing up the results of the competition between the sonarmen, who of them helped the commander in the course of the search for and attack of the target most effectively from the standpoint of tactics was considered.

The senior commanders, in visiting the ship which has borne the title of excellent for 15 years, remind the seamen of the crew's glorious traditions and prompt the officers on what attention should be concentrated at one or another stage of combat training. The chief of the unit political department, for example, noted after a regular departure for sea that as yet not all possibilities are being used to improve the moral microclimate in the crew and that in the tensest moments of the attack individual officers cannot cope with emotions and "put pressure on the voice" unnecessarily. This remark was considered on subsequent cruises.

...The forcing of the antisubmarine barrier began at a depth which was optimum from the standpoint of hydrology. A variety of factors which influence the detection range were considered. On the ship, everything was subordinated to the condition of secrecy. The "enemy" also strives not to give himself away in any way. But here the operation of his sonars is fixed. It means that the PLO [antisubmarine warfare] ships are persistently looking for the submarine. And after a time sonarman Petty Officer 2d Class V. Semenov reported:

"Noise of propellers on bearing.... I presume it is an escort ship."

And here the second target was classified, and the third....

Receiving this report, the commander of the ship decided: it is impossible to evade, it is necessary to break through the antisubmarine barrier with the employment of weapons. And he issued the necessary commands.

The ship's combat section keeps the situation on all targets. The sonarmen take bearings and report and the navigator, Captain-Lieutenant A. Golovko, a political officer who, by the way, is permitted to stand underway watch, and the executive officer determine and average data on the elements of the targets' movement from tables.

To which ship does the bearing change the least? In instants the commander evaluates the information which has been received: "The extreme ship is the most dangerous target." The command sounds. And the ships of the hunter-killer group are already beginning the turn toward the submarine. But they were late. Torpedoes rushed toward the target one after the other.

The submarine changes course quickly. The submariners successfully employed means of sonar counteraction, distracted the "enemy" to a false direction and, increasing speed, broke away from the pursuit. The antisubmarine barrier was overcome. Ahead of the submariners waited the accomplishment of one more mission which, in accordance with the tactical concept, was the primary combat-training mission.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON U.S. PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 13-16

[Article by Lt Col P. Kochukov, candidate of historical sciences: "U.S. Intrigues in the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] The large-scale military preparations unfolded recently by the Pentagon in the Indian Ocean area, particularly in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, are causing justified uneasiness in the world public at large. As CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated in his remarks on 10 December 1980 at a meeting with members of both houses of Parliament of the Republic of India, "the area of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is becoming an increasingly dangerous center of international tension. Powers situated many thousands of kilometers from this area have concentrated a military armada here, are intensively building up arms, are expanding the network of their military bases, and are subjecting small countries who will not be led by them to pressure and threats, all under the far-fetched pretext of defending their 'vital interests'."

A sharp increase in military presence, the threat of unleashing war against nations who have cast off the imperialist yoke, increased assistance to counter-revolutionary forces fighting against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and, finally, a direct attempt to employ American Armed Forces against Iran--this is a far from complete list of steps which U.S. leaders are taking to turn one more part of the world into a zone with a high incidence of conflicts and into a new base of military opposition to forces of progress and peace.

In late 1979 the White House made wide use of the Iranian-American conflict to justify its provocative activities, and particularly the problem of hostages seized in the U.S. Embassy building in Tehran. In addition, a story was initiated about the need for American military steps in view of the development of events in Afghanistan--the introduction of a limited Soviet military contingent into that country at the request of its lawful government. But if the chronology of events is reconstructed, it will become clear that all this is merely a pretext, a propaganda "screen" for Washington's true intentions.

The heightened interest in this region on the part of the United States is determined by a number of points. According to plans of American strategists, military presence in the Indian Ocean must play the role of a deterrent capable of halting

the development of progressive trends in countries of the region, or even eliminate them. By putting forth the theory that a "crisis arc" exists in the Indian Ocean zone, American ruling circles attempt to justify their intent to set U.S. military force in opposition to the peoples' striving for social liberation.

No small importance is attached to the task of assuring the economic interests of imperialist countries. Fifty percent of the oil consumed by West European states and Australia and 90 percent of Japan's oil is transported over Indian Ocean lines of communication. The importance of these lines of communication also is growing for the United States.

The so-called "Carter Doctrine" was advanced as substantiation of American claims to this zone. It essentially envisaged establishment of U.S. world domination. It declares, in particular, the Indian Ocean zone and the Persian Gulf above all as a region of U.S. "vital interests" and consequently considers it necessary to "defend" it with the direct employment of armed forces. It is apparent that this means an attempt to establish military control over a region in which one-third of mankind lives.

According to foreign press reports, the White House's course toward militarization of the Indian Ocean presumes the implementation of measures of a long-term and short-term character to be undertaken by the United States both individually and with the inclusion of allies.

By the middle of 1980 the United States had deployed a naval grouping of more than 30 ships in the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters, including two aircraft carriers, escort ships, and an amphibious group which included five amphibious warfare ships with 1,800 Marines aboard.¹ It alternates carriers from the Seventh and Sixth fleets--the "Kitty Hawk," "Midway," "Forrestal," "Coral Sea," "Chester W. Nimitz" and "Constellation." According to American press information, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean has become permanent and plans for expanding it are being developed.

The Pentagon's attempt at an armed invasion of Iran in violation of all norms of international law attests to the danger of plans connected with naval forces permanently deployed in this region.² The failure of this impudent act did not stop the American militarists. New variants for employment of the naval grouping are being examined in the United States, such as for mining the oil ports of Iran, blockading the Persian Gulf, bombing Iranian oil fields, landing assault forces and so on.

Beginning in January 1980 the United States began to make regular flights by B-52 strategic bombers for developing the Indian Ocean region. Aircraft based on the island of Guam participate in the flights. In March 1980 two B-52's took off from the continental United States and made a nonstop around-the-world flight including a run through the Persian Gulf zone. They refueled over Great Britain, Spain, and in the vicinity of Diego Garcia and Okinawa. U.S. tactical aviation, with activities supported by E-3A AWACS early warning and control aircraft using bases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, also is developing the Near Eastern theater.

In the opinion of American "Hawks," the presence of U.S. naval and air forces alone in this region is not enough. The NEW YORK TIMES wrote that "they are

convinced that the deployment of American ground forces is necessary." To this should be added that highly placed Pentagon officials left the understanding in a meeting with journalists in March 1980 that "in case the need arises the possibility of U.S. employment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf is not precluded."

A permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean is viewed in the United States merely as the first step on the path of "developing" this region. Washington simultaneously is devoting much attention to forming "rapid deployment forces," which, in the words of former assistant to the president for national security affairs Brzezinski, will permit "taking rapid, effective and possibly preemptive steps in those parts of the world where U.S. vital interests may be affected."

It is reported in the foreign press that units of the 1st and 3d Marine divisions as well as the 82d Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division with experience of conducting aggressive combat actions in Vietnam make up the basis of this interventionist corps. According to Pentagon calculations, the movement of forces intended for actions in the Indian Ocean could begin 24 hours after an appropriate order and last up to two weeks. Heavy weapons for the first echelon will be located aboard special transport vessels (so-called floating depots for arms and combat equipment). It is planned to begin their deployment in mid-1983.

Plans are for these ship-depots with stores of heavy weapons, ammunition, fuel and water aboard to be located in "ports of countries friendly to the United States" not far from crisis areas. In case of an aggravation in the situation, they will be moved to the site of the conflict to await air delivery of troops from the United States. The U.S. Defense Department is allocating \$210 million in FY 1981 for constructing the first two such tenders. Seven conventional cargo transports with arms for a 10,000-man grouping intended for operations in the Near and Middle East have been sent to the island of Diego Garcia as a preliminary to the commissioning of these tenders.

It is planned to expand the capabilities of moving invasion forces to countries in the Indian Ocean basin by the development and production of approximately 50 new transport aircraft. According to the plan of American specialists, they are intended for moving tanks and other heavy weapons in the interests of forces moved for the capture of airfields located near ports or coastal areas which are needed for unloading the floating arms and combat equipment depots.

At the present time C-5A (74 units) and C-141 (241 units) aircraft are the basis of the military transport aviation inventory. The American command is extending the service life of the entire inventory of C-5A aircraft from 7,100 to 30,000 hours and is increasing the payload of C-141 aircraft by 30 percent by lengthening the fuselage. The U.S. Defense Department plans to purchase an additional 26 tanker aircraft for supporting their flights.

According to American press reports, the effectiveness of American military policy is determined to a significant extent by U.S. capabilities of using military bases in the Indian Ocean. Its key base here is located on the island of Diego Garcia (Chagos Archipelago).³ According to an agreement between the United States and Great Britain made on 30 December 1966, the United States can use this island for 50 years. As of the present it has a major U.S. Navy communications center, an

airfield with a concrete runway 3,600 m long, a pier capable of receiving any combatants, POL and ammunition depots as well as other facilities. The work of improving the base further continues. The island's position at a crossroads of lines of communication in the geographic center of the region allows the United States to exercise effective control over them, as foreign specialists believe. As a result of creation of the the base on Diego Garcia the Indian Ocean has become a connecting link in a strategic system uniting U.S. groupings in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and in the Mediterranean.

The United States also succeeded in gaining consent for use of naval and air bases in Oman, Kenya and Somali. In addition, it already has access to the Australian base at Cockburn Sound. Great reliance is being placed on use of the territory of Egypt, Israel and Pakistan in case it is necessary to move American troops to countries in the Near and Middle East.

In carrying out its aggressive plans, the White House is counting on NATO allies and Japan, hoping to undertake a certain "division of duties" in connection with a prospective broad U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf. According to western press reports, Washington is requiring its partners in the North Atlantic Alliance to draw up programs permitting an acceleration of the call-up of the military reserves in case of an aggravation of the situation so as to replace American troops in Europe which might be needed in the Near East. The Pentagon believes that West European passenger aircraft must be ready to deliver American subunits from the United States to Europe if U.S. military transport aviation is being used for movement to the Near East. In addition, NATO allies are being directed to beef up their naval forces and naval aviation so as to assure their participation in Atlantic Ocean patrols should the United States have to send its combatants and aircraft to the Indian Ocean.

Great Britain, which declared its intent to "play a greater role in the Indian Ocean," is coming out vigorously in the role of "junior partner" in implementing the Pentagon's militaristic plans. Within the framework of this policy it was announced in mid-1980 that two destroyers, three frigates and several supply vessels from the British Navy were being sent to the Indian Ocean. In late April 1980 a detachment of FRG ships were sent to this region for several months for the first time. The foreign press announced the possibility of the arrival of an Australian carrier group in the Arabian Sea as well as combatants from Italy and the Netherlands. The zone of operation of the military ANZUS bloc has been extended to the Indian Ocean.

Similar pressure is being exerted on Japan. The Pentagon is planning to use this country's naval forces to perform certain missions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (ASW in the northwest Pacific, control of sea lines of communication from Guam to Taiwan, and others) so as to free an additional number of American combatants for actions in the Indian Ocean.

States of the Indian Ocean are vitally interested in seeing that their region does not become an arena of confrontation. They are persistently seeking materialization of the idea of preventing the unfolding of the arms race here. The question of turning the region into a zone of peace was vigorously discussed at a session of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean, which completed work in June 1980. It is indicative that the American delegation applied much effort to

hinder the committee's work. These actions by the United States generated condemnation on the part of the aforementioned states, which viewed them as one further confirmation of Washington's course toward a further fanning of tensions in the region.

The Chinese leadership holds a double-dealing position. While speaking for a normalization of the situation in the Indian Ocean, Maoist propaganda is conducting a slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union and is repeating imperialist fabrications about the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean in an attempt to justify the Pentagon's deployment of a base on Diego Garcia and its other militaristic actions.

The military preparations and political measures being taken by Washington in the Indian Ocean zone are aimed against the peoples of this region. The Declaration adopted in May 1980 at a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact member nations states that "the major build-up in American naval presence and its activities in the Indian Ocean and an expansion of existing foreign military bases and creation of new ones there is in direct contradiction to the plan approved by the United Nations for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, creates a threat to the security and independence of many countries, and leads to the creation of a new center of international tension."

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail on this see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 6, 1980, pp 59-63--Ed.
2. For more detail on the American armed adventure in Iran see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 9, 1980, pp 9-13--Ed.
3. For more detail on this base see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1979, pp 84-86--Ed.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

GROUND FORCES: VIEWS ON U.S. DEFENSIVE TACTICS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 29-34

[Article by Col N. Tsapenko, candidate of military sciences, docent: "The Battalion Tactical Group in the 'Active Defense'"]

[Excerpts] The attempt by the U.S. Armed Forces command to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is reflected not only in a constant increase in military expenditures and not only in an improvement in the organization and establishment of troops and their outfitting with contemporary combat equipment, but also in an improvement in the theory and practice of conducting combat operations under present-day conditions. Of interest in this regard is the theory of so-called "active defense"* developed by U.S. military specialists. It is finding practical application in the organization and conduct of various ground force exercises.

This article, written on the basis of foreign military press materials, examines certain issues in the organization of the battalion tactical group "active defense." As American military specialists note, the "active defense" is conducted by battalion tactical groups formed by decision of the brigade commander for the period of combat.

As U.S. military specialists believe, the cohesive actions of the battalion tactical group and the high state of training of its personnel may be the guarantee of success of its actions in the "active defense." The main element here remains the constant destruction of enemy forces for weakening him to such an extent that he is forced to give up further offensive actions and shift to the defensive.

*For more detail see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 7, 1980, pp 27-33 - Ed.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

GROUND FORCES: COMMENTS ON U.S. BATTLEFIELD MONITORING

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 38-41

[Article by Engr-Col F. Dmitriyev, candidate of technical sciences: "The U.S. Army's REMBASS System"]

[Excerpts] The U.S. Army command is giving considerable attention in its militaristic preparations to the creation of reliable all-weather technical reconnaissance means, considering this one of the ways for assuring effective command and control on the battlefield. In the opinion of American military specialists, the importance of their use is determined by the fact that battlefield reconnaissance to the operational depth is a necessary condition for effective actions to isolate the enemy ground forces conducting combat. At the present time it is being done basically by various airborne means. As noted in the foreign press, however, the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance drops considerably under conditions of very broken terrain, in the presence of dense vegetation and with the enemy's capable and extensive use of means and methods of concealment.

These difficulties of aerial reconnaissance were displayed especially heavily during the U.S. aggressive war in Indochina, and as a result the American command concluded the need for creating fundamentally new means of ground reconnaissance--reconnaissance and signaling devices (RSP). According to foreign press information, the effectiveness of their combat use was so high that the U.S. Army command decided to begin developing a new generation of RSP in the early 1970's on the basis of the latest scientific-technological achievements.* Its main purpose was to create those reconnaissance facilities which could operate successfully under conditions of any theater of military operations and in armed conflict of various scales.

In 1972 the United States began implementing a program for developing such RSP and other means for expanding their combat capabilities. The system of remotely controlled battlefield RSP being created was designated REMBASS (Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System). The development of system facilities has been completed at the present time and they are undergoing troop testing. A decision is expected in 1982 on the beginning of their series production and delivery to the troops.

*See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 7, 1980, pp 33-37 concerning American first-generation RSP - Ed.

It is planned to outfit REB [electronic warfare] battalions and reconnaissance battalions now being set up in U.S. ground force divisions with the equipment of this system. The foreign press emphasizes that it is not planned to have a direct transmission of reconnaissance data supplied by the system to control levels higher than divisions.

REMBASS systems will include the RSF themselves, radio facilities for relaying signals and data, system control devices and apparatus for processing reconnaissance data for the purpose of displaying the situation in the system's zone of action. The principle of its combat employment is shown in Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced].

Reports are seen in the foreign press that the Marine Corps is showing interest in the new system in addition to the U.S. ground forces and that the Air Force command is proposing to use its equipment for air base security. Great Britain, the FRG and France also are examining the possibility of equipping their armed forces with this system.

On the whole, the U.S. and NATO military leadership believes that use of the REMBASS system will permit a considerable increase in the effectiveness of battlefield command and control, including in such a theater of military operations as the Central European. The intention to deploy this system in troop units again attests to the Pentagon's attempt to make use of all achievements of scientific-technical progress for military purposes.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

VIEWS ON AIR SUPPORT OF U.S. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 47-52

[Article by Maj V. Valentinov: "'Rapid Deployment Force' Aviation in Exercises"]

[Excerpts] In accordance with attempts by U.S. aggressive circles to expand American military presence in various parts of the globe and to create a special troop contingent for use in "regions of vital importance for the United States" and on the territory of developing countries above all, the Pentagon officially announced the formation (as of 1 March 1980) of highly mobile "rapid reaction forces," which later were redesignated the "rapid deployment force."

Air force units and subunits are an important component of these interventionist forces. According to foreign press reports, they will include up to 5-6 tactical air wings intended chiefly for supporting combined units, units and subunits of ground forces and marines from the air. In addition, the air force will accomplish a number of other important missions. For example, the swift movement of the "rapid deployment force" to a given region is made the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command [MAC], and the refueling of combat and military transport aircraft as they perform intercontinental flights is made the responsibility of the Strategic Air Command [SAC].

With consideration of the above, the U.S. Air Force command is taking a number of steps aimed at further increasing the combat readiness of air units and subunits assigned to the "rapid deployment force." To this end it has stepped up their combat training, devoting much attention to conducting various kinds of exercises. As noted by the foreign military press, the number and scale of the exercises have increased considerably and the missions accomplished in their course have become noticeably more complex. The exercises are being held both within the Air Force framework and in coordination with other branches of the Armed Forces, but chiefly under near-combat conditions.

In addition to exercises "Dragontime-80/4," "Red Flag-80/4," "Proud Phantom" and "Bright Star" described in this article, several other such activities were held previously in the United States in 1980, particularly: an exercise to practice combat coordination of an all-arms troop formation (in April at Fort Bragg, North Carolina); an exercise to test the effectiveness and reliability of control over these forces from an airborne command post (in May at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida); an exercise by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the planning of which was

conducted by the "rapid deployment force" staff in May in Washington); a command and staff exercise for moving troops to the Middle East (in June in Washington) and others.

The western press, and the American press in particular, covers the aforementioned exercises and maneuvers in a very tendentious manner. Primary emphasis is placed on praising the combat capabilities of units and subunits of American aviation and other branches of the Armed Forces included in the "rapid deployment force." An attempt thus is being made to frighten peoples of the Near and Middle East and of other regions of the world who are struggling for national independence. But even the press cannot conceal the fact that not all these exercises go off well. In particular, it was reported that 11 American soldiers were crippled during the drop of a parachute assault force in Exercise "Dragontime-80/4," one of the latest A-10A ground attack aircraft was demolished in Exercise "Red Flag-80/4," and a C-141 heavy military transport aircraft crashed at the very beginning of Exercise "Bright Star" during a landing at the Cairo-West Air Base with the result that the crew of six and seven servicemen accompanying the cargo died.

But no crashes or mutilation of servicemen stop the provocative hullabaloo of the American militarists. U.S. militaristic preparations continue.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON NATO TESTS OF F-16 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 52-55

[Article by Col (Ret) G. Osipov, candidate of military sciences, and Maj N. Kolesnikov: "Testing the F-16 Aircraft in Europe"]

[Excerpts] A significant place in NATO plans for building up air might is set aside for the new American F-16 tactical fighters which are entering the inventory of air forces of the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. According to foreign press reports, they are intended for conducting aerial combat and delivering strikes against ground targets, and it is planned to use their modifications as REB [electronic warfare] aircraft and fighter-interceptors in the air defense system.

But the sorry experience of flights of American F-104 aircraft in Europe, where a large number of air force pilots of the FRG and other countries died as a result of numerous crashes, forced purchasers of the F-16 fighter to give more thorough consideration to the conditions of its combat employment and operation in the European theaters of military operation. Testing of the F-16 under the difficult climatic conditions of Europe was conducted in early 1979 for this purpose.

The primary goals of the tests were to check and evaluate the capabilities of moving F-16 aircraft from the United States to Europe to reinforce the NATO Air Force grouping, an evaluation of their capability to conduct aerial combat and deliver attacks against ground targets, and a check of the aircraft's flying and operational qualities during flights in winter from ice-covered airfields and under difficult meteorological conditions (SMU), in snowfall and with icing. Simultaneous tests were made of the engine, armament and equipment as well as the suitability of European airfields for these aircraft.

After the fighter tests were conducted, a number of American firms proposed to remedy the deficiencies uncovered in the future. As reported in the foreign press, the F-16 aircraft intended for conducting combat actions under simple meteorological conditions costs six million dollars, with the cost of a modified version to be \$11 million. For this reason Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway announced their intention to purchase aircraft costing only six million dollars each.

The character and results of tests of the multirole F-16 tactical fighters in Europe attest to the unremitting attention of the NATO bloc's military leadership to building up the combat might of their air forces as a most important means for carrying out aggressive plans.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON NATO FIGHTER AVIATION RADARS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 56-60

[Article by Engr-Lt Col I. Aleksandrov: "Prospects for Development of Fighter Airborne Radars"]

[Excerpts] In pursuit of military superiority over countries of the socialist community, U.S. militaristic circles are continuing to step up efforts to create new models of military equipment by also shoving their allies in the aggressive NATO bloc on the path of intensifying the arms race. Much attention is being given to improving fighter aircraft, particularly increasing the effectiveness of their airborne radars.

Fighter radars have undergone qualitative changes in recent decades. Initially they were made as a means for night interceptors to detect targets and determine their coordinates roughly, and later they began to be used to control aircraft weapons in an intercept and in conducting aerial combat, with recognition systems also included in them. The next step in developing airborne radars was their use to accomplish navigational tasks and combat not only aerial targets, but ground targets as well. At the present time radars have become an organic part of the fighters' sighting and navigation systems. In the opinion of air force specialists of the main western countries, however, the radars in the inventory are obsolete and do not meet modern requirements for operating range, capability of detecting low-flying targets, electronic countercountermeasures, number of targets which can be tracked simultaneously, range of missions to be accomplished and degree of reliability. In this connection, as the foreign press reports, it is planned to replace or modernize practically all existing radars.

Foreign military specialists believe that the next phase in the evolution of radars will be their integration into a single flight and airborne weapons control system. In addition to the radars, it will include electro-optical and navigational gear, a multimode display system, and controls for weapons, aircraft and engine. In their opinion, the single system will provide prompt and reliable target detection, lock-on and tracking as well as automatic maneuvering of the aircraft and employment of weapons for accurate destruction of the object of attack. Technical development of airborne radars for the single systems has not yet begun, but research is in the concept development stage. At the same time, so-called transition radars are being made intensively which in the future may be included in the single systems.

Basic characteristics of some fighter airborne radars in the inventory and being developed in capitalist countries, compiled from foreign press materials, are given in the table [table not reproduced] (operating wavelengths of all radars are in the 3-cm band and so are not indicated here).

Requirements being placed on radars of the following generation and those now being made largely coincide. Foreign military specialists include among them: an increase in target detection range in the upper hemisphere and against the background of the earth; an increase in resolution and coordinate measurement accuracy; an expansion in the range of missions to be performed; an increase in ECCM; and an improvement in reliability and other technical characteristics of the radars. Realization of these requirements determines the primary directions for development of airborne radars.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON MILITARY PLANS FOR U.S. MERCHANT FLEET

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 71-75

[Article by Lt Col M. Gromov: "The Merchant Fleet in the Pentagon's Plans"]

[Excerpts] The U.S. military-political leadership considers the merchant fleet to be an important reserve of the naval forces, terming it a part of the Navy or even a fourth branch of the Armed Forces. Evidence of this is served by the experience of broad inclusion of commercial vessels in World War II as well as in the aggressive wars of American imperialism in Korea and Vietnam. Merchant vessels were used in these wars not only for logistical supply of troops but, as reported in the foreign press, they took a direct part in amphibious assault operations.

A trend can be traced clearly in the last two decades toward the more active inclusion of the merchant fleet in the Navy's sphere of activities. It encompasses above all the sea movement of troops, participation in naval exercises and the training of a reserve cadre of navymen in case of war.

While placing ever greater emphasis on use of the merchant fleet for troop movements by sea in peacetime and preparing it for war in every possible way, the U.S. Navy command is devoting very great attention to increasing its mobilization readiness. To this end requirements for individual types and classes of vessels for appropriate periods in the future are being forecast; contracts are being let with private shipowners for ensuring the constant presence of a certain number of specialized vessels in the KMP [Military Sealift Command] which are impossible to obtain from other sources at the first request; and composite data are being drawn up with respect to the number and classes of vessels which the KMP can obtain from shipowning companies if necessary.

An additional source for satisfying the Navy's transport needs is the national defense reserve fleet which includes vessels of the Department of Commerce (270) as well as transports and vessels transferred from the Navy to the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce (for the purpose of supply economy). As noted in the foreign press, vessels of the reserve fleet have the following readiness categories for being placed in operation in conformity with the sequence of transfer to the regular Navy: A -- in 5-10 days; B -- in 20-25 days; C -- in two months or more. Vessels can be taken out of the reserve by order of the Chief of Naval Operations after coordination of this matter with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON U.S. NAVY SEA-SURFACE OBSERVATION SYSTEMS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 75-79

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank B. Tyul'pakov: "Development of U.S. Navy Sea-Surface Observation Systems"]

[Excerpts] The command elements of the U.S. Navy and navies of other countries of the aggressive NATO bloc set aside an important place in plans for preparing their fleets for conducting combat operations under conditions of massive employment of missile weapons to measures for increasing the effectiveness of surveillance of the sea-surface condition in operationally important parts of the ocean.

Foreign naval specialists believe that antiship missiles [PKR] employed from ships, aircraft, submarines and shore-based launchers will have a considerable influence on the character of combat operations and will become the main source of threat for seaborne forces. There will be a sharp increase in the role of missile strikes, which are planned for delivery at so-called over-the-horizon ranges and, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, the outcome of combat will be successful most probably for the one who is first to deliver the missile strike. It is also believed that combat actions by a ship force must include the detection and destruction of the platform before it employs its weapons, or detection and destruction first of the flying missiles, and then of the platform. It is envisaged that surveillance will be set up over missile platforms even before their arrival in the area of combat actions, which will permit the commander to obtain necessary information on the enemy and degree of the threat in good time.

The American press also points to the difficulties of long-range detection of attacking missiles for antimissile defense purposes. This is connected with the fact that existing means of detection, reconnaissance and target designation of the force and of the individual ship cannot accomplish this mission successfully. In this regard the naval command is making considerable efforts to create special spaceborne means of observing the sea surface in the near future and to improve the shore-based system of surveillance and develop new technical means of detection, reconnaissance and target designation of missile weapons for manned and unmanned aircraft, helicopters and combatants.

The development and improvement of sea-surface observation systems and equipment in sea and ocean theaters of military operations is viewed by the U.S. Navy command in an overall system of measures for increasing the efficiency of managing

the actions of fleets and controlling forces at sea, and is tied in with tasks of creating an automated operational control system, the NCCS (Naval Command and Control System).^{*} Fleet command centers, which comprise the basis of this system, are given the responsibility, simultaneously with accomplishment of control missions, for providing ship forces with information on the surface situation. They perform the collection of information from various surveillance and reconnaissance sources and their processing and preparation in a form suitable for display, decisionmaking and transmission to tactical flag ship control centers over specially assigned radio communications channels.

As the U.S. Navy command believes, attainment of this goal will permit an abrupt increase in combat readiness of forces at sea and will make it easier for the commander to make a timely decision for combat or for conducting an operation or combat actions.

^{*}For more detail see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 11, 1978, pp 76-84 - Ed.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON NATO SUBMARINE SONAR EQUIPMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 6 Feb 81) pp 79-82

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank A. Prostakov, candidate of naval sciences, docent]

[Excerpts] Diesel submarines hold a prominent place along with nuclear-powered submarines in the aggressive plans of naval leaders in NATO bloc countries. According to information of the reference work "Jane's," fleets of countries in the North Atlantic Alliance had 136 diesel submarines as of the middle of 1980. In the opinion of foreign specialists, diesel submarines have certain advantages over nuclear-powered submarines. This includes, in particular, less noise, which improves operating conditions for sonars (GAS) in accomplishing ASW missions.

At the present time, as the foreign press reports, there is evidence of an integration of sonar equipment with the BIUS [Navy Tactical Data System: NTDS] and fire control systems taking place on the basis of extensive use of EVM [electronic computers]. As a result there has been a qualitative change in practical capabilities of sonar gear, with an increase in probability of target detection and classification of the contact made. In addition, tracking several targets (up to six) simultaneously, quickly identifying changes in their maneuvering, receiving information automatically, passing it continuously to all coupled systems and displaying it on screens and displays graphically in a form suitable for immediate use and recording it where necessary has become a reality.

Digital processing of signals allowed submarine passive location systems to determine bearing and distance to a target with sufficient accuracy only from target noises.

Finally, the integration of different systems on the basis of EVM simplified monitoring of the operation and servicing of GAS and permitted a reduction in servicing personnel, which is of no small importance for diesel submarines, which are of relatively small displacement.

What follows is an examination of the equipment of diesel submarines in the navies of Italy, Norway, the FRG, France and the Netherlands.

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